Linux 5.4

Pull cramfs fix from Al Viro:
 "Regression fix, fallen through the cracks"

* 'fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
  cramfs: fix usage on non-MTD device

.mailmap

@@ -108,6 +108,10 @@ Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgg@mellanox.com>
 Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
 Javi Merino <javi.merino@kernel.org> <javi.merino@arm.com>
 <javier@osg.samsung.com> <javier.martinez@collabora.co.uk>
+Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jayachandranc@netlogicmicro.com>
+Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@broadcom.com>
+Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jchandra@digeo.com>
+Jayachandran C <c.jayachandran@gmail.com> <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
 Jean Tourrilhes <jt@hpl.hp.com>
 <jean-philippe@linaro.org> <jean-philippe.brucker@arm.com>
 Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pretzel.yyz.us>

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -486,6 +486,8 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -12,3 +12,5 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    spectre
    l1tf
    mds
+   tsx_async_abort
+   multihit.rst

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/multihit.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+iTLB multihit
+=============
+
+iTLB multihit is an erratum where some processors may incur a machine check
+error, possibly resulting in an unrecoverable CPU lockup, when an
+instruction fetch hits multiple entries in the instruction TLB. This can
+occur when the page size is changed along with either the physical address
+or cache type. A malicious guest running on a virtualized system can
+exploit this erratum to perform a denial of service attack.
+
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+Variations of this erratum are present on most Intel Core and Xeon processor
+models. The erratum is not present on:
+
+   - non-Intel processors
+
+   - Some Atoms (Airmont, Bonnell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus, Saltwell, Silvermont)
+
+   - Intel processors that have the PSCHANGE_MC_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this issue:
+
+   ==============  =================================================
+   CVE-2018-12207  Machine Check Error Avoidance on Page Size Change
+   ==============  =================================================
+
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+Privileged software, including OS and virtual machine managers (VMM), are in
+charge of memory management. A key component in memory management is the control
+of the page tables. Modern processors use virtual memory, a technique that creates
+the illusion of a very large memory for processors. This virtual space is split
+into pages of a given size. Page tables translate virtual addresses to physical
+addresses.
+
+To reduce latency when performing a virtual to physical address translation,
+processors include a structure, called TLB, that caches recent translations.
+There are separate TLBs for instruction (iTLB) and data (dTLB).
+
+Under this errata, instructions are fetched from a linear address translated
+using a 4 KB translation cached in the iTLB. Privileged software modifies the
+paging structure so that the same linear address using large page size (2 MB, 4
+MB, 1 GB) with a different physical address or memory type.  After the page
+structure modification but before the software invalidates any iTLB entries for
+the linear address, a code fetch that happens on the same linear address may
+cause a machine-check error which can result in a system hang or shutdown.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the iTLB multihit erratum can be mounted from malicious
+guests in a virtualized system.
+
+
+iTLB multihit system information
+--------------------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current iTLB
+multihit status of the system:whether the system is vulnerable and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+     * - Not affected
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages
+       - Software changes mitigate this issue.
+     * - KVM: Vulnerable
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+
+
+Enumeration of the erratum
+--------------------------------
+
+A new bit has been allocated in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (PSCHANGE_MC_NO) msr
+and will be set on CPU's which are mitigated against this issue.
+
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR                Not present   Possibly vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '0'           Likely vulnerable,check model
+   IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES[PSCHANGE_MC_NO]    '1'           Not vulnerable
+   =======================================   ===========   ===============================
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+This erratum can be mitigated by restricting the use of large page sizes to
+non-executable pages.  This forces all iTLB entries to be 4K, and removes
+the possibility of multiple hits.
+
+In order to mitigate the vulnerability, KVM initially marks all huge pages
+as non-executable. If the guest attempts to execute in one of those pages,
+the page is broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+If EPT is disabled or not available on the host, KVM is in control of TLB
+flushes and the problematic situation cannot happen.  However, the shadow
+EPT paging mechanism used by nested virtualization is vulnerable, because
+the nested guest can trigger multiple iTLB hits by modifying its own
+(non-nested) page tables.  For simplicity, KVM will make large pages
+non-executable in all shadow paging modes.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line and KVM - module parameter
+------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism for marking huge pages as
+non-executable can be controlled with a module parameter "nx_huge_pages=".
+The kernel command line allows to control the iTLB multihit mitigations at
+boot time with the option "kvm.nx_huge_pages=".
+
+The valid arguments for these options are:
+
+  ==========  ================================================================
+  force       Mitigation is enabled. In this case, the mitigation implements
+              non-executable huge pages in Linux kernel KVM module. All huge
+              pages in the EPT are marked as non-executable.
+              If a guest attempts to execute in one of those pages, the page is
+              broken down into 4K pages, which are then marked executable.
+
+  off	      Mitigation is disabled.
+
+  auto        Enable mitigation only if the platform is affected and the kernel
+              was not booted with the "mitigations=off" command line parameter.
+	      This is the default option.
+  ==========  ================================================================
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source, you may assume that the guest will
+   not attempt to maliciously exploit these errata and no further action is
+   required.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+   If the guest comes from an untrusted source, the guest host kernel will need
+   to apply iTLB multihit mitigation via the kernel command line or kvm
+   module parameter.

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TAA - TSX Asynchronous Abort
+======================================
+
+TAA is a hardware vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to
+data which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using asynchronous
+aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability only affects Intel processors that support Intel
+Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) when the TAA_NO bit (bit 8)
+is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.  On processors where the MDS_NO bit
+(bit 5) is 0 in the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR, the existing MDS mitigations
+also mitigate against TAA.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the TAA
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`tsx_async_abort_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entry is related to this TAA issue:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2019-11135  TAA    TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) condition on some
+                          microprocessors utilizing speculative execution may
+                          allow an authenticated user to potentially enable
+                          information disclosure via a side channel with
+                          local access.
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load or L1 refill operations, processors write
+data into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in
+those buffers can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Intel TSX is an extension to the x86 instruction set architecture that adds
+hardware transactional memory support to improve performance of multi-threaded
+software. TSX lets the processor expose and exploit concurrency hidden in an
+application due to dynamically avoiding unnecessary synchronization.
+
+TSX supports atomic memory transactions that are either committed (success) or
+aborted. During an abort, operations that happened within the transactional region
+are rolled back. An asynchronous abort takes place, among other options, when a
+different thread accesses a cache line that is also used within the transactional
+region when that access might lead to a data race.
+
+Immediately after an uncompleted asynchronous abort, certain speculatively
+executed loads may read data from those internal buffers and pass it to dependent
+operations. This can be then used to infer the value via a cache side channel
+attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+The victim of a malicious actor does not need to make use of TSX. Only the
+attacker needs to begin a TSX transaction and raise an asynchronous abort
+which in turn potenitally leaks data stored in the buffers.
+
+More detailed technical information is available in the TAA specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst <tsx_async_abort>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the TAA vulnerability can be implemented from unprivileged
+applications running on hosts or guests.
+
+As for MDS, the attacker has no control over the memory addresses that can
+be leaked. Only the victim is responsible for bringing data to the CPU. As
+a result, the malicious actor has to sample as much data as possible and
+then postprocess it to try to infer any useful information from it.
+
+A potential attacker only has read access to the data. Also, there is no direct
+privilege escalation by using this technique.
+
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort_sys_info:
+
+TAA system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current TAA status
+of mitigated systems. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+.. list-table::
+
+   * - 'Vulnerable'
+     - The CPU is affected by this vulnerability and the microcode and kernel mitigation are not applied.
+   * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+     - The system tries to clear the buffers but the microcode might not support the operation.
+   * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+     - The microcode has been updated to clear the buffers. TSX is still enabled.
+   * - 'Mitigation: TSX disabled'
+     - TSX is disabled.
+   * - 'Not affected'
+     - The CPU is not affected by this issue.
+
+.. _ucode_needed:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode-based
+mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose the
+CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection takes
+effect; otherwise a few CPU cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+The state in the tsx_async_abort sysfs file reflects this situation
+accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+--------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode which is
+required. If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default.
+
+
+The mitigation can be controlled at boot time via a kernel command line option.
+See :ref:`taa_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Affected systems where the host has TAA microcode and TAA is mitigated by
+having disabled TSX previously, are not vulnerable regardless of the status
+of the VMs.
+
+In all other cases, if the host either does not have the TAA microcode or
+the kernel is not mitigated, the system might be vulnerable.
+
+
+.. _taa_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the TAA mitigations at boot time with
+the option "tsx_async_abort=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		This option disables the TAA mitigation on affected platforms.
+                If the system has TSX enabled (see next parameter) and the CPU
+                is affected, the system is vulnerable.
+
+  full	        TAA mitigation is enabled. If TSX is enabled, on an affected
+                system it will clear CPU buffers on ring transitions. On
+                systems which are MDS-affected and deploy MDS mitigation,
+                TAA is also mitigated. Specifying this option on those
+                systems will have no effect.
+
+  full,nosmt    The same as tsx_async_abort=full, with SMT disabled on
+                vulnerable CPUs that have TSX enabled. This is the complete
+                mitigation. When TSX is disabled, SMT is not disabled because
+                CPU is not vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx_async_abort=full".
+
+The kernel command line also allows to control the TSX feature using the
+parameter "tsx=" on CPUs which support TSX control. MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is used
+to control the TSX feature and the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM
+and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+The valid options are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  off		Disables TSX on the system.
+
+                Note that this option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+                not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1
+                and which get the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+                update. This new MSR allows for the reliable deactivation of
+                the TSX functionality.
+
+  on		Enables TSX.
+
+                Although there are mitigations for all known security
+                vulnerabilities, TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+                several previous speculation-related CVEs, and so there may be
+                unknown security risks associated with leaving it enabled.
+
+  auto		Disables TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present, otherwise enables TSX
+                on the system.
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "tsx=off".
+
+The following combinations of the "tsx_async_abort" and "tsx" are possible. For
+affected platforms tsx=auto is equivalent to tsx=off and the result will be:
+
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full         The system will use VERW to clear CPU
+                                          buffers. Cross-thread attacks are still
+					  possible on SMT machines.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   As above, cross-thread attacks on SMT
+                                          mitigated.
+  tsx=on     tsx_async_abort=off          The system is vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full         TSX might be disabled if microcode
+                                          provides a TSX control MSR. If so,
+					  system is not vulnerable.
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt   Ditto
+  tsx=off    tsx_async_abort=off          ditto
+  =========  ==========================   =========================================
+
+
+For unaffected platforms "tsx=on" and "tsx_async_abort=full" does not clear CPU
+buffers.  For platforms without TSX control (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=0)
+"tsx" command line argument has no effect.
+
+For the affected platforms below table indicates the mitigation status for the
+combinations of CPUID bit MD_CLEAR and IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bits MDS_NO
+and TSX_CTRL_MSR.
+
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+  MDS_NO   MD_CLEAR   TSX_CTRL_MSR   Status
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+    0          0            0        Vulnerable (needs microcode)
+    0          1            0        MDS and TAA mitigated via VERW
+    1          1            0        MDS fixed, TAA vulnerable if TSX enabled
+                                     because MD_CLEAR has no meaning and
+                                     VERW is not guaranteed to clear buffers
+    1          X            1        MDS fixed, TAA can be mitigated by
+                                     VERW or TSX_CTRL_MSR
+  =======  =========  =============  ========================================
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If all user space applications are from a trusted source and do not execute
+untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation can be
+disabled. The same applies to virtualized environments with trusted guests.
+
+
+2. Untrusted userspace and guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+If there are untrusted applications or guests on the system, enabling TSX
+might allow a malicious actor to leak data from the host or from other
+processes running on the same physical core.
+
+If the microcode is available and the TSX is disabled on the host, attacks
+are prevented in a virtualized environment as well, even if the VMs do not
+explicitly enable the mitigation.
+
+
+.. _taa_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+The kernel's default action for vulnerable processors is:
+
+  - Deploy TSX disable mitigation (tsx_async_abort=full tsx=off).

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2055,6 +2055,25 @@
 			KVM MMU at runtime.
 			Default is 0 (off)
 
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages=
+			[KVM] Controls the software workaround for the
+			X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT bug.
+			force	: Always deploy workaround.
+			off	: Never deploy workaround.
+			auto    : Deploy workaround based on the presence of
+				  X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT.
+
+			Default is 'auto'.
+
+			If the software workaround is enabled for the host,
+			guests do need not to enable it for nested guests.
+
+	kvm.nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio=
+			[KVM] Controls how many 4KiB pages are periodically zapped
+			back to huge pages.  0 disables the recovery, otherwise if
+			the value is N KVM will zap 1/Nth of the 4KiB pages every
+			minute.  The default is 60.
+
 	kvm-amd.nested=	[KVM,AMD] Allow nested virtualization in KVM/SVM.
 			Default is 1 (enabled)
 
@@ -2636,6 +2655,13 @@
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       l1tf=off [X86]
 					       mds=off [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86]
+
+				Exceptions:
+					       This does not have any effect on
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages when
+					       kvm.nx_huge_pages=force.
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2651,6 +2677,7 @@
 				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
 				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
 					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+					       tsx_async_abort=full,nosmt [X86]
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
@@ -4848,6 +4875,71 @@
 			interruptions from clocksource watchdog are not
 			acceptable).
 
+	tsx=		[X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+			Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+			support TSX control.
+
+			This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+			on	- Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+				mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+				TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+				several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+				so there may be unknown	security risks associated
+				with leaving it enabled.
+
+			off	- Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+				option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+				not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+				MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+				the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+				update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+				deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+			auto	- Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+				  otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+			See Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+			for more details.
+
+	tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+			Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+			Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+			certain CPUs that support Transactional
+			Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+			exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+			information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+			conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+			data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+			access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+			access.
+
+			This parameter controls the TAA mitigation.  The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+				     if TSX is enabled.
+
+			full,nosmt - Enable TAA mitigation and disable SMT on
+				     vulnerable CPUs. If TSX is disabled, SMT
+				     is not disabled because CPU is not
+				     vulnerable to cross-thread TAA attacks.
+			off        - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			tsx_async_abort=full.  On CPUs which are MDS affected
+			and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+			required and doesn't provide any additional
+			mitigation.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
 	turbografx.map[2|3]=	[HW,JOY]
 			TurboGraFX parallel port interface
 			Format:

Documentation/networking/tls-offload.rst

@@ -436,6 +436,10 @@ by the driver:
    encryption.
  * ``tx_tls_ooo`` - number of TX packets which were part of a TLS stream
    but did not arrive in the expected order.
+ * ``tx_tls_skip_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets which were part of
+   a TLS stream and arrived out-of-order, but skipped the HW offload routine
+   and went to the regular transmit flow as they were retransmissions of the
+   connection handshake.
  * ``tx_tls_drop_no_sync_data`` - number of TX packets which were part of
    a TLS stream dropped, because they arrived out of order and associated
    record could not be found.

Documentation/x86/index.rst

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    mds
    microcode
    resctrl_ui
+   tsx_async_abort
    usb-legacy-support
    i386/index
    x86_64/index

Documentation/x86/tsx_async_abort.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) mitigation
+================================
+
+.. _tsx_async_abort:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel attack on internal buffers in some
+Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS).  In this
+case certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations
+when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a Transactional
+Synchronization Extensions (TSX) transaction.  This includes loads with no
+fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from
+the same uarch data structures as in MDS, with same scope of exposure i.e.
+same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that
+support TSX.
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+a) TSX disable - one of the mitigations is to disable TSX. A new MSR
+IA32_TSX_CTRL will be available in future and current processors after
+microcode update which can be used to disable TSX. In addition, it
+controls the enumeration of the TSX feature bits (RTM and HLE) in CPUID.
+
+b) Clear CPU buffers - similar to MDS, clearing the CPU buffers mitigates this
+vulnerability. More details on this approach can be found in
+:ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ =============    ============================================================
+ off              Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+                  tsx_async_abort=off is supplied on the kernel command line.
+
+ tsx disabled     Mitigation is enabled. TSX feature is disabled by default at
+                  bootup on processors that support TSX control.
+
+ verw             Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+                  advertised in CPUID.
+
+ ucode needed     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+                  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+                  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+                  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+                  effort approach without guarantee.
+ =============    ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and the "tsx_async_abort" kernel command line parameter is
+not provided then the kernel selects an appropriate mitigation depending on the
+status of RTM and MD_CLEAR CPUID bits.
+
+Below tables indicate the impact of tsx=on|off|auto cmdline options on state of
+TAA mitigation, VERW behavior and TSX feature for various combinations of
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits.
+
+1. "tsx=off"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=off
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default         Yes           Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default         No         Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled          Yes           TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Disabled           X             None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+2. "tsx=on"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=on
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default        Yes            Same as MDS          Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case   Invalid case       Invalid case         Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default        No          Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Enabled          Yes               None              Same as MDS
+    1          X           1          Enabled          X              None needed          None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+3. "tsx=auto"
+
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES bits     Result with cmdline tsx=auto
+----------------------------------  -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+TAA_NO     MDS_NO     TSX_CTRL_MSR  TSX state     VERW can clear  TAA mitigation       TAA mitigation
+                                    after bootup  CPU buffers     tsx_async_abort=off  tsx_async_abort=full
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+    0          0           0         HW default    Yes                Same as MDS           Same as MDS
+    0          0           1        Invalid case  Invalid case        Invalid case          Invalid case
+    0          1           0         HW default    No              Need ucode update     Need ucode update
+    0          1           1          Disabled      Yes               TSX disabled          TSX disabled
+    1          X           1          Enabled       X                 None needed           None needed
+=========  =========  ============  ============  ==============  ===================  ======================
+
+In the tables, TSX_CTRL_MSR is a new bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES that
+indicates whether MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL is supported.
+
+There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR:
+
+      Bit 0: When set it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM)
+             sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the
+             XBEGIN instruction).
+
+      Bit 1: When set it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature
+             (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and
+             CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0).

MAINTAINERS

@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ F:	drivers/net/ethernet/alacritech/*
 
 FORCEDETH GIGABIT ETHERNET DRIVER
 M:	Rain River <rain.1986.08.12@gmail.com>
-M:	Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
+M:	Zhu Yanjun <zyjzyj2000@gmail.com>
 L:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/net/ethernet/nvidia/*
@@ -3053,6 +3053,7 @@ M:	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
 R:	Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
 R:	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
 R:	Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
+R:	Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
 L:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
 L:	bpf@vger.kernel.org
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf.git
@@ -3260,7 +3261,6 @@ S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/cpufreq/bmips-cpufreq.c
 
 BROADCOM BMIPS MIPS ARCHITECTURE
-M:	Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@gmail.com>
 M:	Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
 L:	bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com
 L:	linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
@@ -3737,7 +3737,6 @@ F:	drivers/crypto/cavium/cpt/
 
 CAVIUM THUNDERX2 ARM64 SOC
 M:	Robert Richter <rrichter@cavium.com>
-M:	Jayachandran C <jnair@caviumnetworks.com>
 L:	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org (moderated for non-subscribers)
 S:	Maintained
 F:	arch/arm64/boot/dts/cavium/thunder2-99xx*
@@ -8299,11 +8298,14 @@ F:	drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/
 
 INTEL IOMMU (VT-d)
 M:	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+M:	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
 L:	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
-T:	git git://git.infradead.org/iommu-2.6.git
+T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/joro/iommu.git
 S:	Supported
-F:	drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+F:	drivers/iommu/dmar.c
+F:	drivers/iommu/intel*.[ch]
 F:	include/linux/intel-iommu.h
+F:	include/linux/intel-svm.h
 
 INTEL IOP-ADMA DMA DRIVER
 R:	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
@@ -10519,8 +10521,12 @@ F:	mm/memblock.c
 F:	Documentation/core-api/boot-time-mm.rst
 
 MEMORY MANAGEMENT
+M:	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
 L:	linux-mm@kvack.org
 W:	http://www.linux-mm.org
+T:	quilt https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmotm/
+T:	quilt https://ozlabs.org/~akpm/mmots/
+T:	git git://github.com/hnaz/linux-mm.git
 S:	Maintained
 F:	include/linux/mm.h
 F:	include/linux/gfp.h
@@ -17209,6 +17215,7 @@ F:	virt/lib/
 
 VIRTIO AND VHOST VSOCK DRIVER
 M:	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
+M:	Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
 L:	kvm@vger.kernel.org
 L:	virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org
 L:	netdev@vger.kernel.org
@@ -18034,6 +18041,7 @@ F:	Documentation/vm/zsmalloc.rst
 ZSWAP COMPRESSED SWAP CACHING
 M:	Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
 M:	Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
+M:	Vitaly Wool <vitaly.wool@konsulko.com>
 L:	linux-mm@kvack.org
 S:	Maintained
 F:	mm/zswap.c

Makefile

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 4
 SUBLEVEL = 0
-EXTRAVERSION = -rc6
+EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Kleptomaniac Octopus
 
 # *DOCUMENTATION*
@@ -917,6 +917,9 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_RELR),y)
 LDFLAGS_vmlinux	+= --pack-dyn-relocs=relr
 endif
 
+# make the checker run with the right architecture
+CHECKFLAGS += --arch=$(ARCH)
+
 # insure the checker run with the right endianness
 CHECKFLAGS += $(if $(CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN),-mbig-endian,-mlittle-endian)
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6-logicpd-baseboard.dtsi

@@ -328,6 +328,10 @@
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_pwm3>;
 };
 
+&snvs_pwrkey {
+	status = "okay";
+};
+
 &ssi2 {
 	status = "okay";
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-sabreauto.dtsi

@@ -230,6 +230,8 @@
 			accelerometer@1c {
 				compatible = "fsl,mma8451";
 				reg = <0x1c>;
+				pinctrl-names = "default";
+				pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_mma8451_int>;
 				interrupt-parent = <&gpio6>;
 				interrupts = <31 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_LOW>;
 			};
@@ -628,6 +630,12 @@
 			>;
 		};
 
+		pinctrl_mma8451_int: mma8451intgrp {
+			fsl,pins = <
+				MX6QDL_PAD_EIM_BCLK__GPIO6_IO31		0xb0b1
+			>;
+		};
+
 		pinctrl_pwm3: pwm1grp {
 			fsl,pins = <
 				MX6QDL_PAD_SD4_DAT1__PWM3_OUT		0x1b0b1

arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c-ev1.dts

@@ -183,14 +183,12 @@
 
 	ov5640: camera@3c {
 		compatible = "ovti,ov5640";
-		pinctrl-names = "default";
-		pinctrl-0 = <&ov5640_pins>;
 		reg = <0x3c>;
 		clocks = <&clk_ext_camera>;
 		clock-names = "xclk";
 		DOVDD-supply = <&v2v8>;
-		powerdown-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 18 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
-		reset-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
+		powerdown-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 18 (GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH | GPIO_PUSH_PULL)>;
+		reset-gpios = <&stmfx_pinctrl 19 (GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW | GPIO_PUSH_PULL)>;
 		rotation = <180>;
 		status = "okay";
 
@@ -223,15 +221,8 @@
 
 			joystick_pins: joystick {
 				pins = "gpio0", "gpio1", "gpio2", "gpio3", "gpio4";
-				drive-push-pull;
 				bias-pull-down;
 			};
-
-			ov5640_pins: camera {
-				pins = "agpio2", "agpio3"; /* stmfx pins 18 & 19 */
-				drive-push-pull;
-				output-low;
-			};
 		};
 	};
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/stm32mp157c.dtsi

@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@
 			interrupt-names = "int0", "int1";
 			clocks = <&rcc CK_HSE>, <&rcc FDCAN_K>;
 			clock-names = "hclk", "cclk";
-			bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1400 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
+			bosch,mram-cfg = <0x0 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
@@ -945,7 +945,7 @@
 			interrupt-names = "int0", "int1";
 			clocks = <&rcc CK_HSE>, <&rcc FDCAN_K>;
 			clock-names = "hclk", "cclk";
-			bosch,mram-cfg = <0x0 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
+			bosch,mram-cfg = <0x1400 0 0 32 0 0 2 2>;
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/sun8i-a83t-tbs-a711.dts

@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@
 	vqmmc-supply = <&reg_dldo1>;
 	non-removable;
 	wakeup-source;
+	keep-power-in-suspend;
 	status = "okay";
 
 	brcmf: wifi@1 {

arch/arm/mach-sunxi/mc_smp.c

@@ -481,14 +481,18 @@ static void sunxi_mc_smp_cpu_die(unsigned int l_cpu)
 static int sunxi_cpu_powerdown(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int cluster)
 {
 	u32 reg;
+	int gating_bit = cpu;
 
 	pr_debug("%s: cluster %u cpu %u\n", __func__, cluster, cpu);
 	if (cpu >= SUNXI_CPUS_PER_CLUSTER || cluster >= SUNXI_NR_CLUSTERS)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (is_a83t && cpu == 0)
+		gating_bit = 4;
+
 	/* gate processor power */
 	reg = readl(prcm_base + PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG(cluster));
-	reg |= PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG_CORE(cpu);
+	reg |= PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG_CORE(gating_bit);
 	writel(reg, prcm_base + PRCM_PWROFF_GATING_REG(cluster));
 	udelay(20);
 

arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1028a-qds.dts

@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 	status = "okay";
 
 	i2c-mux@77 {
-		compatible = "nxp,pca9847";
+		compatible = "nxp,pca9547";
 		reg = <0x77>;
 		#address-cells = <1>;
 		#size-cells = <0>;

arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mm.dtsi

@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma2: dma-controller@302c0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x302c0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA2_ROOT>,
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma3: dma-controller@302b0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x302b0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 34 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA3_ROOT>,
@@ -737,7 +737,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma1: dma-controller@30bd0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mm-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x30bd0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MM_CLK_SDMA1_ROOT>,

arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mn.dtsi

@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma3: dma-controller@302b0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x302b0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 34 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA3_ROOT>,
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma2: dma-controller@302c0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x302c0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 103 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA2_ROOT>,
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@
 			};
 
 			sdma1: dma-controller@30bd0000 {
-				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx7d-sdma";
+				compatible = "fsl,imx8mn-sdma", "fsl,imx8mq-sdma";
 				reg = <0x30bd0000 0x10000>;
 				interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 				clocks = <&clk IMX8MN_CLK_SDMA1_ROOT>,

arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-zii-ultra.dtsi

@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
 		regulator-name = "0V9_ARM";
 		regulator-min-microvolt = <900000>;
 		regulator-max-microvolt = <1000000>;
-		gpios = <&gpio3 19 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
+		gpios = <&gpio3 16 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 		states = <1000000 0x1
 		           900000 0x0>;
 		regulator-always-on;

arch/arm64/include/asm/asm-uaccess.h

@@ -58,23 +58,6 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.endm
 #endif
 
-/*
- * These macros are no-ops when UAO is present.
- */
-	.macro	uaccess_disable_not_uao, tmp1, tmp2
-	uaccess_ttbr0_disable \tmp1, \tmp2
-alternative_if ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO
-	SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)
-alternative_else_nop_endif
-	.endm
-
-	.macro	uaccess_enable_not_uao, tmp1, tmp2, tmp3
-	uaccess_ttbr0_enable \tmp1, \tmp2, \tmp3
-alternative_if ARM64_ALT_PAN_NOT_UAO
-	SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)
-alternative_else_nop_endif
-	.endm
-
 /*
  * Remove the address tag from a virtual address, if present.
  */

arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h

@@ -283,23 +283,6 @@ static inline void set_pte_at(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
 	set_pte(ptep, pte);
 }
 
-#define __HAVE_ARCH_PTE_SAME
-static inline int pte_same(pte_t pte_a, pte_t pte_b)
-{
-	pteval_t lhs, rhs;
-
-	lhs = pte_val(pte_a);
-	rhs = pte_val(pte_b);
-
-	if (pte_present(pte_a))
-		lhs &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
-
-	if (pte_present(pte_b))
-		rhs &= ~PTE_RDONLY;
-
-	return (lhs == rhs);
-}
-
 /*
  * Huge pte definitions.
  */

arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h

@@ -378,20 +378,34 @@ do {									\
 extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
 #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n)					\
 ({									\
-	__arch_copy_from_user((to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n));	\
+	unsigned long __acfu_ret;					\
+	uaccess_enable_not_uao();					\
+	__acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to),			\
+				      __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n));	\
+	uaccess_disable_not_uao();					\
+	__acfu_ret;							\
 })
 
 extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
 #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n)					\
 ({									\
-	__arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), (from), (n));	\
+	unsigned long __actu_ret;					\
+	uaccess_enable_not_uao();					\
+	__actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to),	\
+				    (from), (n));			\
+	uaccess_disable_not_uao();					\
+	__actu_ret;							\
 })
 
 extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
 #define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n)					\
 ({									\
-	__arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to),			\
-			    __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n));		\
+	unsigned long __aciu_ret;					\
+	uaccess_enable_not_uao();					\
+	__aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to),	\
+				    __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), (n));	\
+	uaccess_disable_not_uao();					\
+	__aciu_ret;							\
 })
 
 #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER
@@ -400,8 +414,11 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi
 extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
 static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
 {
-	if (access_ok(to, n))
+	if (access_ok(to, n)) {
+		uaccess_enable_not_uao();
 		n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
+		uaccess_disable_not_uao();
+	}
 	return n;
 }
 #define clear_user	__clear_user

arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h

@@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ int __arm64_get_clock_mode(struct timekeeper *tk)
 }
 #define __arch_get_clock_mode __arm64_get_clock_mode
 
-static __always_inline
-int __arm64_use_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata)
-{
-	return !vdata[CS_HRES_COARSE].clock_mode;
-}
-#define __arch_use_vsyscall __arm64_use_vsyscall
-
 static __always_inline
 void __arm64_update_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata, struct timekeeper *tk)
 {

arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S

@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
  * Alignment fixed up by hardware.
  */
 ENTRY(__arch_clear_user)
-	uaccess_enable_not_uao x2, x3, x4
 	mov	x2, x1			// save the size for fixup return
 	subs	x1, x1, #8
 	b.mi	2f
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ uao_user_alternative 9f, strh, sttrh, wzr, x0, 2
 	b.mi	5f
 uao_user_alternative 9f, strb, sttrb, wzr, x0, 0
 5:	mov	x0, #0
-	uaccess_disable_not_uao x2, x3
 	ret
 ENDPROC(__arch_clear_user)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user)

arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S

@@ -54,10 +54,8 @@
 
 end	.req	x5
 ENTRY(__arch_copy_from_user)
-	uaccess_enable_not_uao x3, x4, x5
 	add	end, x0, x2
 #include "copy_template.S"
-	uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
 	mov	x0, #0				// Nothing to copy
 	ret
 ENDPROC(__arch_copy_from_user)

arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S

@@ -56,10 +56,8 @@
 end	.req	x5
 
 ENTRY(__arch_copy_in_user)
-	uaccess_enable_not_uao x3, x4, x5
 	add	end, x0, x2
 #include "copy_template.S"
-	uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
 	mov	x0, #0
 	ret
 ENDPROC(__arch_copy_in_user)

arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S

@@ -53,10 +53,8 @@
 
 end	.req	x5
 ENTRY(__arch_copy_to_user)
-	uaccess_enable_not_uao x3, x4, x5
 	add	end, x0, x2
 #include "copy_template.S"
-	uaccess_disable_not_uao x3, x4
 	mov	x0, #0
 	ret
 ENDPROC(__arch_copy_to_user)

arch/arm64/lib/uaccess_flushcache.c

@@ -28,7 +28,11 @@ void memcpy_page_flushcache(char *to, struct page *page, size_t offset,
 unsigned long __copy_user_flushcache(void *to, const void __user *from,
 				     unsigned long n)
 {
-	unsigned long rc = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+	unsigned long rc;
+
+	uaccess_enable_not_uao();
+	rc = __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+	uaccess_disable_not_uao();
 
 	/* See above */
 	__clean_dcache_area_pop(to, n - rc);

arch/mips/include/asm/vdso/vsyscall.h

@@ -28,13 +28,6 @@ int __mips_get_clock_mode(struct timekeeper *tk)
 }
 #define __arch_get_clock_mode __mips_get_clock_mode
 
-static __always_inline
-int __mips_use_vsyscall(struct vdso_data *vdata)
-{
-	return (vdata[CS_HRES_COARSE].clock_mode != VDSO_CLOCK_NONE);
-}
-#define __arch_use_vsyscall __mips_use_vsyscall
-
 /* The asm-generic header needs to be included after the definitions above */
 #include <asm-generic/vdso/vsyscall.h>
 

arch/mips/sgi-ip27/Kconfig

@@ -38,10 +38,3 @@ config REPLICATE_KTEXT
 	  Say Y here to enable replicating the kernel text across multiple
 	  nodes in a NUMA cluster.  This trades memory for speed.
 
-config REPLICATE_EXHANDLERS
-	bool "Exception handler replication support"
-	depends on SGI_IP27
-	help
-	  Say Y here to enable replicating the kernel exception handlers
-	  across multiple nodes in a NUMA cluster. This trades memory for
-	  speed.

arch/mips/sgi-ip27/ip27-init.c

@@ -69,23 +69,14 @@ static void per_hub_init(cnodeid_t cnode)
 
 	hub_rtc_init(cnode);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_REPLICATE_EXHANDLERS
-	/*
-	 * If this is not a headless node initialization,
-	 * copy over the caliased exception handlers.
-	 */
-	if (get_compact_nodeid() == cnode) {
-		extern char except_vec2_generic, except_vec3_generic;
-		extern void build_tlb_refill_handler(void);
-
-		memcpy((void *)(CKSEG0 + 0x100), &except_vec2_generic, 0x80);
-		memcpy((void *)(CKSEG0 + 0x180), &except_vec3_generic, 0x80);
-		build_tlb_refill_handler();
-		memcpy((void *)(CKSEG0 + 0x100), (void *) CKSEG0, 0x80);
-		memcpy((void *)(CKSEG0 + 0x180), &except_vec3_generic, 0x100);
+	if (nasid) {
+		/* copy exception handlers from first node to current node */
+		memcpy((void *)NODE_OFFSET_TO_K0(nasid, 0),
+		       (void *)CKSEG0, 0x200);
 		__flush_cache_all();
+		/* switch to node local exception handlers */
+		REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, PI_CALIAS_SIZE, PI_CALIAS_SIZE_8K);
 	}
-#endif
 }
 
 void per_cpu_init(void)

arch/mips/sgi-ip27/ip27-memory.c

@@ -332,11 +332,7 @@ static void __init mlreset(void)
 		 * thinks it is a node 0 address.
 		 */
 		REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, PI_REGION_PRESENT, (region_mask | 1));
-#ifdef CONFIG_REPLICATE_EXHANDLERS
-		REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, PI_CALIAS_SIZE, PI_CALIAS_SIZE_8K);
-#else
 		REMOTE_HUB_S(nasid, PI_CALIAS_SIZE, PI_CALIAS_SIZE_0);
-#endif
 
 #ifdef LATER
 		/*

arch/powerpc/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c

@@ -1141,6 +1141,19 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 		goto out_addrs;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * If we have seen a tail call, we need a second pass.
+	 * This is because bpf_jit_emit_common_epilogue() is called
+	 * from bpf_jit_emit_tail_call() with a not yet stable ctx->seen.
+	 */
+	if (cgctx.seen & SEEN_TAILCALL) {
+		cgctx.idx = 0;
+		if (bpf_jit_build_body(fp, 0, &cgctx, addrs, false)) {
+			fp = org_fp;
+			goto out_addrs;
+		}
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Pretend to build prologue, given the features we've seen.  This will
 	 * update ctgtx.idx as it pretends to output instructions, then we can

arch/sparc/vdso/Makefile

@@ -65,14 +65,14 @@ $(vobjs): KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(filter-out $(GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS) $(SPARC_REG_CFLAGS
 #
 # vDSO code runs in userspace and -pg doesn't help with profiling anyway.
 #
-CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso-note.o = -pg
 CFLAGS_REMOVE_vclock_gettime.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_vdso32/vclock_gettime.o = -pg
 
 $(obj)/%.so: OBJCOPYFLAGS := -S
 $(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,objcopy)
 
-CPPFLAGS_vdso32.lds = $(CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds)
+CPPFLAGS_vdso32/vdso32.lds = $(CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds)
 VDSO_LDFLAGS_vdso32.lds = -m elf32_sparc -soname linux-gate.so.1
 
 #This makes sure the $(obj) subdirectory exists even though vdso32/

arch/x86/Kconfig

@@ -1940,6 +1940,51 @@ config X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
 
 	  If unsure, say y.
 
+choice
+	prompt "TSX enable mode"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	help
+	  Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature
+	  allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which
+	  can lead to a noticeable performance boost.
+
+	  On the other hand it has been shown that TSX can be exploited
+	  to form side channel attacks (e.g. TAA) and chances are there
+	  will be more of those attacks discovered in the future.
+
+	  Therefore TSX is not enabled by default (aka tsx=off). An admin
+	  might override this decision by tsx=on the command line parameter.
+	  Even with TSX enabled, the kernel will attempt to enable the best
+	  possible TAA mitigation setting depending on the microcode available
+	  for the particular machine.
+
+	  This option allows to set the default tsx mode between tsx=on, =off
+	  and =auto. See Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt for more
+	  details.
+
+	  Say off if not sure, auto if TSX is in use but it should be used on safe
+	  platforms or on if TSX is in use and the security aspect of tsx is not
+	  relevant.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF
+	bool "off"
+	help
+	  TSX is disabled if possible - equals to tsx=off command line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_ON
+	bool "on"
+	help
+	  TSX is always enabled on TSX capable HW - equals the tsx=on command
+	  line parameter.
+
+config X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO
+	bool "auto"
+	help
+	  TSX is enabled on TSX capable HW that is believed to be safe against
+	  side channel attacks- equals the tsx=auto command line parameter.
+endchoice
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -399,5 +399,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
 #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 #define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
+#define X86_BUG_TAA			X86_BUG(22) /* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */
+#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -312,9 +312,12 @@ struct kvm_rmap_head {
 struct kvm_mmu_page {
 	struct list_head link;
 	struct hlist_node hash_link;
+	struct list_head lpage_disallowed_link;
+
 	bool unsync;
 	u8 mmu_valid_gen;
 	bool mmio_cached;
+	bool lpage_disallowed; /* Can't be replaced by an equiv large page */
 
 	/*
 	 * The following two entries are used to key the shadow page in the
@@ -859,6 +862,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	 */
 	struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
 	struct list_head zapped_obsolete_pages;
+	struct list_head lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages;
 	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_node mmu_sp_tracker;
 	struct kvm_page_track_notifier_head track_notifier_head;
 
@@ -933,6 +937,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	bool exception_payload_enabled;
 
 	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
+	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 };
 
 struct kvm_vm_stat {
@@ -946,6 +951,7 @@ struct kvm_vm_stat {
 	ulong mmu_unsync;
 	ulong remote_tlb_flush;
 	ulong lpages;
+	ulong nx_lpage_splits;
 	ulong max_mmu_page_hash_collisions;
 };
 

arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

@@ -93,6 +93,18 @@
 						  * Microarchitectural Data
 						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
 						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO		BIT(6)	 /*
+						  * The processor is not susceptible to a
+						  * machine check error due to modifying the
+						  * code page size along with either the
+						  * physical address or cache type
+						  * without TLB invalidation.
+						  */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR		BIT(7)	/* MSR for TSX control is available. */
+#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO			BIT(8)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to
+						 * TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
@@ -103,6 +115,10 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
 
+#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL		0x00000122
+#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE		BIT(0)	/* Disable RTM feature */
+#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR		BIT(1)	/* Disable TSX enumeration */
+
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP		0x00000176

arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 
 /**
- * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
  *
  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
  */

arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h

@@ -988,4 +988,11 @@ enum mds_mitigations {
 	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
 };
 
+enum taa_mitigations {
+	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c

@@ -1586,9 +1586,6 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void)
 {
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	unsigned int value;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	int logical_apicid, ldr_apicid;
-#endif
 
 	if (disable_apic) {
 		disable_ioapic_support();
@@ -1626,16 +1623,21 @@ static void setup_local_APIC(void)
 	apic->init_apic_ldr();
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-	/*
-	 * APIC LDR is initialized.  If logical_apicid mapping was
-	 * initialized during get_smp_config(), make sure it matches the
-	 * actual value.
-	 */
-	logical_apicid = early_per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_logical_apicid, cpu);
-	ldr_apicid = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(apic_read(APIC_LDR));
-	WARN_ON(logical_apicid != BAD_APICID && logical_apicid != ldr_apicid);
-	/* always use the value from LDR */
-	early_per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_logical_apicid, cpu) = ldr_apicid;
+	if (apic->dest_logical) {
+		int logical_apicid, ldr_apicid;
+
+		/*
+		 * APIC LDR is initialized.  If logical_apicid mapping was
+		 * initialized during get_smp_config(), make sure it matches
+		 * the actual value.
+		 */
+		logical_apicid = early_per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_logical_apicid, cpu);
+		ldr_apicid = GET_APIC_LOGICAL_ID(apic_read(APIC_LDR));
+		if (logical_apicid != BAD_APICID)
+			WARN_ON(logical_apicid != ldr_apicid);
+		/* Always use the value from LDR. */
+		early_per_cpu(x86_cpu_to_logical_apicid, cpu) = ldr_apicid;
+	}
 #endif
 
 	/*

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS)	+= proc.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
 
 ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
-obj-y			+= intel.o intel_pconfig.o
+obj-y			+= intel.o intel_pconfig.o tsx.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_PM)	+= intel_epb.o
 endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD)		+= amd.o

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -105,6 +106,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	mds_select_mitigation();
+	taa_select_mitigation();
 
 	arch_smt_update();
 
@@ -268,6 +270,100 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"TAA: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_VERW]		= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED]	= "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* TAA mitigation is turned off on the cmdline (tsx_async_abort=off) */
+	if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	else
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+	 * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+	 * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+	 * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+	 *
+	 * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+	 * update is required.
+	 */
+	ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+	if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+	    !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+	 * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+	 */
+	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		cpu_smt_disable(false);
+
+out:
+	pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		taa_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
@@ -786,13 +882,10 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 }
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
 
 void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 {
-	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
-		return;
-
 	mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user) {
@@ -819,6 +912,17 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (taa_mitigation) {
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+	case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -1149,6 +1253,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 }
 
+bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
 
@@ -1304,11 +1411,24 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
 		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
+	else
+		return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
+}
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 {
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
 }
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
 #endif
 
 static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
@@ -1328,6 +1448,21 @@ static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
 		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+	    (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1398,6 +1533,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_MDS:
 		return mds_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_TAA:
+		return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+		return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1434,4 +1575,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *bu
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
 #endif

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -1016,13 +1016,14 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #endif
 }
 
-#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
-#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
-#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
-#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
-#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
-#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
-#define NO_SWAPGS	BIT(6)
+#define NO_SPECULATION		BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN		BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB			BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF			BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS			BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY		BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS		BIT(6)
+#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT	BIT(7)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -1043,27 +1044,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
 
 	/* Intel Family 6 */
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_D,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_D,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,		NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP,		NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
@@ -1073,15 +1074,17 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	 * good enough for our purposes.
 	 */
 
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D,		NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
-	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1092,19 +1095,30 @@ static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
 	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
 }
 
-static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+	return ia32_cap;
+}
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
-		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
-
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
@@ -1121,6 +1135,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
 
+	/*
+	 * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
+	 *	- TSX is supported or
+	 *	- TSX_CTRL is present
+	 *
+	 * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
+	 * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
+	 * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
+	 * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
+	 */
+	if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+	    (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
+	     (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1554,6 +1583,8 @@ void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
 #endif
 	cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
 	setup_cr_pinning();
+
+	tsx_init();
 }
 
 void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h

@@ -44,6 +44,22 @@ struct _tlb_table {
 extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
 			    *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+enum tsx_ctrl_states {
+	TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
+	TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+extern __ro_after_init enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;
+
+extern void __init tsx_init(void);
+extern void tsx_enable(void);
+extern void tsx_disable(void);
+#else
+static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
@@ -62,4 +78,6 @@ unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
 
+extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+
 #endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c

@@ -762,6 +762,11 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		detect_tme(c);
 
 	init_intel_misc_features(c);
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
+		tsx_enable();
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
+		tsx_disable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c

@@ -522,6 +522,10 @@ int rdtgroup_mondata_show(struct seq_file *m, void *arg)
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+	if (!rdtgrp) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	md.priv = of->kn->priv;
 	resid = md.u.rid;

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c

@@ -461,10 +461,8 @@ static ssize_t rdtgroup_cpus_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
 	}
 
 	rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
-	rdt_last_cmd_clear();
 	if (!rdtgrp) {
 		ret = -ENOENT;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Directory was removed\n");
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -2648,10 +2646,8 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 	int ret;
 
 	prdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(prgrp_kn);
-	rdt_last_cmd_clear();
 	if (!prdtgrp) {
 		ret = -ENODEV;
-		rdt_last_cmd_puts("Directory was removed\n");
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ *	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state __ro_after_init = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+void tsx_disable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Force all transactions to immediately abort */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is not enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * do not waste resources trying TSX transactions that
+	 * will always abort.
+	 */
+	tsx |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+void tsx_enable(void)
+{
+	u64 tsx;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+	/* Enable the RTM feature in the cpu */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure TSX support is enumerated in CPUID.
+	 * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+	 * can enumerate and use the TSX feature.
+	 */
+	tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static bool __init tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void)
+{
+	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+	/*
+	 * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL.  However, support for this
+	 * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+	 *
+	 * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+	 * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+	 * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+	 * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+	 * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+	 */
+	return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR);
+}
+
+static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+		return TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+
+	return TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+}
+
+void __init tsx_init(void)
+{
+	char arg[5] = {};
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported())
+		return;
+
+	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
+	if (ret >= 0) {
+		if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		} else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		} else {
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+			pr_err("tsx: invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* tsx= not provided */
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+		else
+			tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+	}
+
+	if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
+		tsx_disable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_disable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Clear it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be not set.
+		 */
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	} else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
+
+		/*
+		 * HW defaults TSX to be enabled at bootup.
+		 * We may still need the TSX enable support
+		 * during init for special cases like
+		 * kexec after TSX is disabled.
+		 */
+		tsx_enable();
+
+		/*
+		 * tsx_enable() will change the state of the
+		 * RTM CPUID bit.  Force it here since it is now
+		 * expected to be set.
+		 */
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+	}
+}

arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c

@@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ static bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
 
 	begin = (unsigned long)__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
+	/*
+	 * Handle the case where stack trace is collected _before_
+	 * cea_exception_stacks had been initialized.
+	 */
+	if (!begin)
+		return false;
+
 	end = begin + sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks);
 	/* Bail if @stack is outside the exception stack area. */
 	if (stk < begin || stk >= end)

arch/x86/kernel/early-quirks.c

@@ -710,6 +710,8 @@ static struct chipset early_qrk[] __initdata = {
 	 */
 	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x0f00,
 		PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
+	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3ec4,
+		PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, force_disable_hpet},
 	{ PCI_VENDOR_ID_BROADCOM, 0x4331,
 	  PCI_CLASS_NETWORK_OTHER, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, apple_airport_reset},
 	{}

arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c

@@ -1505,6 +1505,9 @@ void __init tsc_init(void)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (tsc_clocksource_reliable || no_tsc_watchdog)
+		clocksource_tsc_early.flags &= ~CLOCK_SOURCE_MUST_VERIFY;
+
 	clocksource_register_khz(&clocksource_tsc_early, tsc_khz);
 	detect_art();
 }

arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/kern_levels.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
 
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/pat.h>
@@ -47,6 +48,35 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_page_track.h>
 #include "trace.h"
 
+extern bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+
+static int __read_mostly nx_huge_pages = -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
+/* Recovery can cause latency spikes, disable it for PREEMPT_RT.  */
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio = 0;
+#else
+static uint __read_mostly nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio = 60;
+#endif
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages,
+	.get = param_get_bool,
+};
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio_ops = {
+	.set = set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio,
+	.get = param_get_uint,
+};
+
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages, &nx_huge_pages_ops, &nx_huge_pages, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages, "bool");
+module_param_cb(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, &nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio_ops,
+		&nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, 0644);
+__MODULE_PARM_TYPE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio, "uint");
+
 /*
  * When setting this variable to true it enables Two-Dimensional-Paging
  * where the hardware walks 2 page tables:
@@ -352,6 +382,11 @@ static inline bool spte_ad_need_write_protect(u64 spte)
 	return (spte & SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK) != SPTE_AD_ENABLED_MASK;
 }
 
+static bool is_nx_huge_page_enabled(void)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages);
+}
+
 static inline u64 spte_shadow_accessed_mask(u64 spte)
 {
 	MMU_WARN_ON(is_mmio_spte(spte));
@@ -1190,6 +1225,17 @@ static void account_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(slot, gfn);
 }
 
+static void account_huge_nx_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	if (sp->lpage_disallowed)
+		return;
+
+	++kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	list_add_tail(&sp->lpage_disallowed_link,
+		      &kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
+	sp->lpage_disallowed = true;
+}
+
 static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 {
 	struct kvm_memslots *slots;
@@ -1207,6 +1253,13 @@ static void unaccount_shadowed(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
 	kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(slot, gfn);
 }
 
+static void unaccount_huge_nx_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp)
+{
+	--kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits;
+	sp->lpage_disallowed = false;
+	list_del(&sp->lpage_disallowed_link);
+}
+
 static bool __mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(gfn_t gfn, int level,
 					  struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
 {
@@ -2792,6 +2845,9 @@ static bool __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(struct kvm *kvm,
 			kvm_reload_remote_mmus(kvm);
 	}
 
+	if (sp->lpage_disallowed)
+		unaccount_huge_nx_page(kvm, sp);
+
 	sp->role.invalid = 1;
 	return list_unstable;
 }
@@ -3013,6 +3069,11 @@ static int set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep,
 	if (!speculative)
 		spte |= spte_shadow_accessed_mask(spte);
 
+	if (level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL && (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK) &&
+	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled()) {
+		pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK;
+	}
+
 	if (pte_access & ACC_EXEC_MASK)
 		spte |= shadow_x_mask;
 	else
@@ -3233,9 +3294,32 @@ static void direct_pte_prefetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *sptep)
 	__direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, sp, sptep);
 }
 
+static void disallowed_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it,
+				       gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfnp, int *levelp)
+{
+	int level = *levelp;
+	u64 spte = *it.sptep;
+
+	if (it.level == level && level > PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
+	    is_nx_huge_page_enabled() &&
+	    is_shadow_present_pte(spte) &&
+	    !is_large_pte(spte)) {
+		/*
+		 * A small SPTE exists for this pfn, but FNAME(fetch)
+		 * and __direct_map would like to create a large PTE
+		 * instead: just force them to go down another level,
+		 * patching back for them into pfn the next 9 bits of
+		 * the address.
+		 */
+		u64 page_mask = KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level) - KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(level - 1);
+		*pfnp |= gfn & page_mask;
+		(*levelp)--;
+	}
+}
+
 static int __direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int write,
 			int map_writable, int level, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
-			bool prefault)
+			bool prefault, bool lpage_disallowed)
 {
 	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
@@ -3248,6 +3332,12 @@ static int __direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int write,
 
 	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(gpa, level, pfn);
 	for_each_shadow_entry(vcpu, gpa, it) {
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		disallowed_hugepage_adjust(it, gfn, &pfn, &level);
+
 		base_gfn = gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
 		if (it.level == level)
 			break;
@@ -3258,6 +3348,8 @@ static int __direct_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, int write,
 					      it.level - 1, true, ACC_ALL);
 
 			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+			if (lpage_disallowed)
+				account_huge_nx_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -3306,7 +3398,7 @@ static void transparent_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	 * here.
 	 */
 	if (!is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) && !kvm_is_reserved_pfn(pfn) &&
-	    level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
+	    !kvm_is_zone_device_pfn(pfn) && level == PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL &&
 	    PageTransCompoundMap(pfn_to_page(pfn)) &&
 	    !mmu_gfn_lpage_is_disallowed(vcpu, gfn, PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL)) {
 		unsigned long mask;
@@ -3550,11 +3642,14 @@ static int nonpaging_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t v, u32 error_code,
 {
 	int r;
 	int level;
-	bool force_pt_level = false;
+	bool force_pt_level;
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	bool map_writable, write = error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
 
+	force_pt_level = lpage_disallowed;
 	level = mapping_level(vcpu, gfn, &force_pt_level);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level)) {
 		/*
@@ -3588,7 +3683,8 @@ static int nonpaging_map(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t v, u32 error_code,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level))
 		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, gfn, &pfn, &level);
-	r = __direct_map(vcpu, v, write, map_writable, level, pfn, prefault);
+	r = __direct_map(vcpu, v, write, map_writable, level, pfn,
+			 prefault, false);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
@@ -4174,6 +4270,8 @@ static int tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gpa, u32 error_code,
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	int write = error_code & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	bool map_writable;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
 
 	MMU_WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root_hpa));
 
@@ -4184,8 +4282,9 @@ static int tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gpa, u32 error_code,
 	if (r)
 		return r;
 
-	force_pt_level = !check_hugepage_cache_consistency(vcpu, gfn,
-							   PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL);
+	force_pt_level =
+		lpage_disallowed ||
+		!check_hugepage_cache_consistency(vcpu, gfn, PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL);
 	level = mapping_level(vcpu, gfn, &force_pt_level);
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level)) {
 		if (level > PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL &&
@@ -4214,7 +4313,8 @@ static int tdp_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gpa, u32 error_code,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	if (likely(!force_pt_level))
 		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, gfn, &pfn, &level);
-	r = __direct_map(vcpu, gpa, write, map_writable, level, pfn, prefault);
+	r = __direct_map(vcpu, gpa, write, map_writable, level, pfn,
+			 prefault, lpage_disallowed);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);
 	kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn);
@@ -5914,9 +6014,9 @@ restart:
 		 * the guest, and the guest page table is using 4K page size
 		 * mapping if the indirect sp has level = 1.
 		 */
-		if (sp->role.direct &&
-			!kvm_is_reserved_pfn(pfn) &&
-			PageTransCompoundMap(pfn_to_page(pfn))) {
+		if (sp->role.direct && !kvm_is_reserved_pfn(pfn) &&
+		    !kvm_is_zone_device_pfn(pfn) &&
+		    PageTransCompoundMap(pfn_to_page(pfn))) {
 			pte_list_remove(rmap_head, sptep);
 
 			if (kvm_available_flush_tlb_with_range())
@@ -6155,10 +6255,59 @@ static void kvm_set_mmio_spte_mask(void)
 	kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(mask, mask, ACC_WRITE_MASK | ACC_USER_MASK);
 }
 
+static bool get_nx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+	/* Return true when CPU has the bug, and mitigations are ON */
+	return boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT) && !cpu_mitigations_off();
+}
+
+static void __set_nx_huge_pages(bool val)
+{
+	nx_huge_pages = itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation = val;
+}
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	bool old_val = nx_huge_pages;
+	bool new_val;
+
+	/* In "auto" mode deploy workaround only if CPU has the bug. */
+	if (sysfs_streq(val, "off"))
+		new_val = 0;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(val, "force"))
+		new_val = 1;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(val, "auto"))
+		new_val = get_nx_auto_mode();
+	else if (strtobool(val, &new_val) < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	__set_nx_huge_pages(new_val);
+
+	if (new_val != old_val) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list) {
+			mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+			kvm_mmu_zap_all_fast(kvm);
+			mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int kvm_mmu_module_init(void)
 {
 	int ret = -ENOMEM;
 
+	if (nx_huge_pages == -1)
+		__set_nx_huge_pages(get_nx_auto_mode());
+
 	/*
 	 * MMU roles use union aliasing which is, generally speaking, an
 	 * undefined behavior. However, we supposedly know how compilers behave
@@ -6238,3 +6387,116 @@ void kvm_mmu_module_exit(void)
 	unregister_shrinker(&mmu_shrinker);
 	mmu_audit_disable();
 }
+
+static int set_nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+	unsigned int old_val;
+	int err;
+
+	old_val = nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio;
+	err = param_set_uint(val, kp);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) &&
+	    !old_val && nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio) {
+		struct kvm *kvm;
+
+		mutex_lock(&kvm_lock);
+
+		list_for_each_entry(kvm, &vm_list, vm_list)
+			wake_up_process(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+
+		mutex_unlock(&kvm_lock);
+	}
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static void kvm_recover_nx_lpages(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int rcu_idx;
+	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;
+	unsigned int ratio;
+	LIST_HEAD(invalid_list);
+	ulong to_zap;
+
+	rcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
+	spin_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+
+	ratio = READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio);
+	to_zap = ratio ? DIV_ROUND_UP(kvm->stat.nx_lpage_splits, ratio) : 0;
+	while (to_zap && !list_empty(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages)) {
+		/*
+		 * We use a separate list instead of just using active_mmu_pages
+		 * because the number of lpage_disallowed pages is expected to
+		 * be relatively small compared to the total.
+		 */
+		sp = list_first_entry(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages,
+				      struct kvm_mmu_page,
+				      lpage_disallowed_link);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(!sp->lpage_disallowed);
+		kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page(kvm, sp, &invalid_list);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->lpage_disallowed);
+
+		if (!--to_zap || need_resched() || spin_needbreak(&kvm->mmu_lock)) {
+			kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page(kvm, &invalid_list);
+			if (to_zap)
+				cond_resched_lock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+		}
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&kvm->mmu_lock);
+	srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, rcu_idx);
+}
+
+static long get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(u64 start_time)
+{
+	return READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages) && READ_ONCE(nx_huge_pages_recovery_ratio)
+		? start_time + 60 * HZ - get_jiffies_64()
+		: MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+}
+
+static int kvm_nx_lpage_recovery_worker(struct kvm *kvm, uintptr_t data)
+{
+	u64 start_time;
+	long remaining_time;
+
+	while (true) {
+		start_time = get_jiffies_64();
+		remaining_time = get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		while (!kthread_should_stop() && remaining_time > 0) {
+			schedule_timeout(remaining_time);
+			remaining_time = get_nx_lpage_recovery_timeout(start_time);
+			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+		}
+
+		set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+
+		if (kthread_should_stop())
+			return 0;
+
+		kvm_recover_nx_lpages(kvm);
+	}
+}
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	err = kvm_vm_create_worker_thread(kvm, kvm_nx_lpage_recovery_worker, 0,
+					  "kvm-nx-lpage-recovery",
+					  &kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+	if (!err)
+		kthread_unpark(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	if (kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread)
+		kthread_stop(kvm->arch.nx_lpage_recovery_thread);
+}

arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h

@@ -210,4 +210,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
 bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
 				    struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn);
 int kvm_arch_write_log_dirty(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+int kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+void kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm);
+
 #endif

arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h

@@ -614,13 +614,14 @@ static void FNAME(pte_prefetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct guest_walker *gw,
 static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr,
 			 struct guest_walker *gw,
 			 int write_fault, int hlevel,
-			 kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool map_writable, bool prefault)
+			 kvm_pfn_t pfn, bool map_writable, bool prefault,
+			 bool lpage_disallowed)
 {
 	struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL;
 	struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it;
 	unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access;
 	int top_level, ret;
-	gfn_t base_gfn;
+	gfn_t gfn, base_gfn;
 
 	direct_access = gw->pte_access;
 
@@ -665,13 +666,25 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr,
 			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
 	}
 
-	base_gfn = gw->gfn;
+	/*
+	 * FNAME(page_fault) might have clobbered the bottom bits of
+	 * gw->gfn, restore them from the virtual address.
+	 */
+	gfn = gw->gfn | ((addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(gw->level)) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	base_gfn = gfn;
 
 	trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(addr, gw->level, pfn);
 
 	for (; shadow_walk_okay(&it); shadow_walk_next(&it)) {
 		clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep);
-		base_gfn = gw->gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
+
+		/*
+		 * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX
+		 * large page, as the leaf could be executable.
+		 */
+		disallowed_hugepage_adjust(it, gfn, &pfn, &hlevel);
+
+		base_gfn = gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1);
 		if (it.level == hlevel)
 			break;
 
@@ -683,6 +696,8 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr,
 			sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, base_gfn, addr,
 					      it.level - 1, true, direct_access);
 			link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp);
+			if (lpage_disallowed)
+				account_huge_nx_page(vcpu->kvm, sp);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -759,9 +774,11 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, u32 error_code,
 	int r;
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	int level = PT_PAGE_TABLE_LEVEL;
-	bool force_pt_level = false;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	bool map_writable, is_self_change_mapping;
+	bool lpage_disallowed = (error_code & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) &&
+				is_nx_huge_page_enabled();
+	bool force_pt_level = lpage_disallowed;
 
 	pgprintk("%s: addr %lx err %x\n", __func__, addr, error_code);
 
@@ -851,7 +868,7 @@ static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, u32 error_code,
 	if (!force_pt_level)
 		transparent_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, walker.gfn, &pfn, &level);
 	r = FNAME(fetch)(vcpu, addr, &walker, write_fault,
-			 level, pfn, map_writable, prefault);
+			 level, pfn, map_writable, prefault, lpage_disallowed);
 	kvm_mmu_audit(vcpu, AUDIT_POST_PAGE_FAULT);
 
 out_unlock:

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c

@@ -1268,6 +1268,18 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	if (!pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && vcpu->cpu == cpu)
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * If the 'nv' field is POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR, do not change
+	 * PI.NDST: pi_post_block is the one expected to change PID.NDST and the
+	 * wakeup handler expects the vCPU to be on the blocked_vcpu_list that
+	 * matches PI.NDST. Otherwise, a vcpu may not be able to be woken up
+	 * correctly.
+	 */
+	if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR || vcpu->cpu == cpu) {
+		pi_clear_sn(pi_desc);
+		goto after_clear_sn;
+	}
+
 	/* The full case.  */
 	do {
 		old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
@@ -1283,6 +1295,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	} while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
 			   new.control) != old.control);
 
+after_clear_sn:
+
 	/*
 	 * Clear SN before reading the bitmap.  The VT-d firmware
 	 * writes the bitmap and reads SN atomically (5.2.3 in the
@@ -1291,7 +1305,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	 */
 	smp_mb__after_atomic();
 
-	if (!bitmap_empty((unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir, NR_VECTORS))
+	if (!pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc))
 		pi_set_on(pi_desc);
 }
 
@@ -6137,7 +6151,7 @@ static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
 		pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
 		/*
-		 * IOMMU can write to PIR.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
+		 * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
 		 * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
 		 */
 		smp_mb__after_atomic();
@@ -6167,7 +6181,10 @@ static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static bool vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return pi_test_on(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
+	struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
+
+	return pi_test_on(pi_desc) ||
+		(pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && !pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc));
 }
 
 static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h

@@ -355,6 +355,11 @@ static inline int pi_test_and_set_pir(int vector, struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 	return test_and_set_bit(vector, (unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir);
 }
 
+static inline bool pi_is_pir_empty(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	return bitmap_empty((unsigned long *)pi_desc->pir, NR_VECTORS);
+}
+
 static inline void pi_set_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 {
 	set_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
@@ -373,6 +378,12 @@ static inline void pi_clear_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
 }
 
+static inline void pi_clear_sn(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
+{
+	clear_bit(POSTED_INTR_SN,
+		(unsigned long *)&pi_desc->control);
+}
+
 static inline int pi_test_on(struct pi_desc *pi_desc)
 {
 	return test_bit(POSTED_INTR_ON,

arch/x86/kvm/x86.c

@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_entries[] = {
 	{ "mmu_unsync", VM_STAT(mmu_unsync) },
 	{ "remote_tlb_flush", VM_STAT(remote_tlb_flush) },
 	{ "largepages", VM_STAT(lpages, .mode = 0444) },
+	{ "nx_largepages_splitted", VM_STAT(nx_lpage_splits, .mode = 0444) },
 	{ "max_mmu_page_hash_collisions",
 		VM_STAT(max_mmu_page_hash_collisions) },
 	{ NULL }
@@ -1132,13 +1133,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_rdpmc);
  * List of msr numbers which we expose to userspace through KVM_GET_MSRS
  * and KVM_SET_MSRS, and KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST.
  *
- * This list is modified at module load time to reflect the
+ * The three MSR lists(msrs_to_save, emulated_msrs, msr_based_features)
+ * extract the supported MSRs from the related const lists.
+ * msrs_to_save is selected from the msrs_to_save_all to reflect the
  * capabilities of the host cpu. This capabilities test skips MSRs that are
- * kvm-specific. Those are put in emulated_msrs; filtering of emulated_msrs
+ * kvm-specific. Those are put in emulated_msrs_all; filtering of emulated_msrs
  * may depend on host virtualization features rather than host cpu features.
  */
 
-static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
+static const u32 msrs_to_save_all[] = {
 	MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP,
 	MSR_STAR,
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -1179,9 +1182,10 @@ static u32 msrs_to_save[] = {
 	MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 16, MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17,
 };
 
+static u32 msrs_to_save[ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all)];
 static unsigned num_msrs_to_save;
 
-static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
+static const u32 emulated_msrs_all[] = {
 	MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK,
 	MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME_NEW, MSR_KVM_WALL_CLOCK_NEW,
 	HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID, HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL,
@@ -1220,7 +1224,7 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
 	 * by arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c based on CPUID or other MSRs.
 	 * We always support the "true" VMX control MSRs, even if the host
 	 * processor does not, so I am putting these registers here rather
-	 * than in msrs_to_save.
+	 * than in msrs_to_save_all.
 	 */
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC,
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS,
@@ -1239,13 +1243,14 @@ static u32 emulated_msrs[] = {
 	MSR_KVM_POLL_CONTROL,
 };
 
+static u32 emulated_msrs[ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all)];
 static unsigned num_emulated_msrs;
 
 /*
  * List of msr numbers which are used to expose MSR-based features that
  * can be used by a hypervisor to validate requested CPU features.
  */
-static u32 msr_based_features[] = {
+static const u32 msr_based_features_all[] = {
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC,
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS,
 	MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
@@ -1270,6 +1275,7 @@ static u32 msr_based_features[] = {
 	MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES,
 };
 
+static u32 msr_based_features[ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all)];
 static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
 
 static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
@@ -1279,6 +1285,14 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, data);
 
+	/*
+	 * If nx_huge_pages is enabled, KVM's shadow paging will ensure that
+	 * the nested hypervisor runs with NX huge pages.  If it is not,
+	 * L1 is anyway vulnerable to ITLB_MULTIHIT explots from other
+	 * L1 guests, so it need not worry about its own (L2) guests.
+	 */
+	data |= ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO;
+
 	/*
 	 * If we're doing cache flushes (either "always" or "cond")
 	 * we will do one whenever the guest does a vmlaunch/vmresume.
@@ -1298,6 +1312,25 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
 
+	/*
+	 * On TAA affected systems, export MDS_NO=0 when:
+	 *	- TSX is enabled on the host, i.e. X86_FEATURE_RTM=1.
+	 *	- Updated microcode is present. This is detected by
+	 *	  the presence of ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR and ensures
+	 *	  that VERW clears CPU buffers.
+	 *
+	 * When MDS_NO=0 is exported, guests deploy clear CPU buffer
+	 * mitigation and don't complain:
+	 *
+	 *	"Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode"
+	 *
+	 * If TSX is disabled on the system, guests are also mitigated against
+	 * TAA and clear CPU buffer mitigation is not required for guests.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+	    (data & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+		data &= ~ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+
 	return data;
 }
 
@@ -5090,22 +5123,26 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 {
 	struct x86_pmu_capability x86_pmu;
 	u32 dummy[2];
-	unsigned i, j;
+	unsigned i;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(INTEL_PMC_MAX_FIXED != 4,
-			 "Please update the fixed PMCs in msrs_to_save[]");
+			 "Please update the fixed PMCs in msrs_to_saved_all[]");
 
 	perf_get_x86_pmu_capability(&x86_pmu);
 
-	for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save); i++) {
-		if (rdmsr_safe(msrs_to_save[i], &dummy[0], &dummy[1]) < 0)
+	num_msrs_to_save = 0;
+	num_emulated_msrs = 0;
+	num_msr_based_features = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msrs_to_save_all); i++) {
+		if (rdmsr_safe(msrs_to_save_all[i], &dummy[0], &dummy[1]) < 0)
 			continue;
 
 		/*
 		 * Even MSRs that are valid in the host may not be exposed
 		 * to the guests in some cases.
 		 */
-		switch (msrs_to_save[i]) {
+		switch (msrs_to_save_all[i]) {
 		case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
 			if (!kvm_mpx_supported())
 				continue;
@@ -5133,17 +5170,17 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 			break;
 		case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B: {
 			if (!kvm_x86_ops->pt_supported() ||
-				msrs_to_save[i] - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A >=
+				msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A >=
 				intel_pt_validate_hw_cap(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges) * 2)
 				continue;
 			break;
 		case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 + 17:
-			if (msrs_to_save[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 >=
+			if (msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0 >=
 			    min(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, x86_pmu.num_counters_gp))
 				continue;
 			break;
 		case MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 ... MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 + 17:
-			if (msrs_to_save[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 >=
+			if (msrs_to_save_all[i] - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0 >=
 			    min(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC, x86_pmu.num_counters_gp))
 				continue;
 		}
@@ -5151,34 +5188,25 @@ static void kvm_init_msr_list(void)
 			break;
 		}
 
-		if (j < i)
-			msrs_to_save[j] = msrs_to_save[i];
-		j++;
+		msrs_to_save[num_msrs_to_save++] = msrs_to_save_all[i];
 	}
-	num_msrs_to_save = j;
 
-	for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs); i++) {
-		if (!kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(emulated_msrs[i]))
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emulated_msrs_all); i++) {
+		if (!kvm_x86_ops->has_emulated_msr(emulated_msrs_all[i]))
 			continue;
 
-		if (j < i)
-			emulated_msrs[j] = emulated_msrs[i];
-		j++;
+		emulated_msrs[num_emulated_msrs++] = emulated_msrs_all[i];
 	}
-	num_emulated_msrs = j;
 
-	for (i = j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features); i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_based_features_all); i++) {
 		struct kvm_msr_entry msr;
 
-		msr.index = msr_based_features[i];
+		msr.index = msr_based_features_all[i];
 		if (kvm_get_msr_feature(&msr))
 			continue;
 
-		if (j < i)
-			msr_based_features[j] = msr_based_features[i];
-		j++;
+		msr_based_features[num_msr_based_features++] = msr_based_features_all[i];
 	}
-	num_msr_based_features = j;
 }
 
 static int vcpu_mmio_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, int len,
@@ -9428,6 +9456,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.mask_notifier_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.zapped_obsolete_pages);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.lpage_disallowed_mmu_pages);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&kvm->arch.assigned_dev_head);
 	atomic_set(&kvm->arch.noncoherent_dma_count, 0);
 
@@ -9456,6 +9485,11 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 	return kvm_x86_ops->vm_init(kvm);
 }
 
+int kvm_arch_post_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return kvm_mmu_post_init_vm(kvm);
+}
+
 static void kvm_unload_vcpu_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu_load(vcpu);
@@ -9557,6 +9591,11 @@ int x86_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm, int id, gpa_t gpa, u32 size)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_set_memory_region);
 
+void kvm_arch_pre_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	kvm_mmu_pre_destroy_vm(kvm);
+}
+
 void kvm_arch_destroy_vm(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	if (current->mm == kvm->mm) {

block/bfq-iosched.c

@@ -2713,6 +2713,28 @@ static void bfq_bfqq_save_state(struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
 	}
 }
 
+
+static
+void bfq_release_process_ref(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
+{
+	/*
+	 * To prevent bfqq's service guarantees from being violated,
+	 * bfqq may be left busy, i.e., queued for service, even if
+	 * empty (see comments in __bfq_bfqq_expire() for
+	 * details). But, if no process will send requests to bfqq any
+	 * longer, then there is no point in keeping bfqq queued for
+	 * service. In addition, keeping bfqq queued for service, but
+	 * with no process ref any longer, may have caused bfqq to be
+	 * freed when dequeued from service. But this is assumed to
+	 * never happen.
+	 */
+	if (bfq_bfqq_busy(bfqq) && RB_EMPTY_ROOT(&bfqq->sort_list) &&
+	    bfqq != bfqd->in_service_queue)
+		bfq_del_bfqq_busy(bfqd, bfqq, false);
+
+	bfq_put_queue(bfqq);
+}
+
 static void
 bfq_merge_bfqqs(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_io_cq *bic,
 		struct bfq_queue *bfqq, struct bfq_queue *new_bfqq)
@@ -2783,8 +2805,7 @@ bfq_merge_bfqqs(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_io_cq *bic,
 	 */
 	new_bfqq->pid = -1;
 	bfqq->bic = NULL;
-	/* release process reference to bfqq */
-	bfq_put_queue(bfqq);
+	bfq_release_process_ref(bfqd, bfqq);
 }
 
 static bool bfq_allow_bio_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq,
@@ -4899,7 +4920,7 @@ static void bfq_exit_bfqq(struct bfq_data *bfqd, struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
 
 	bfq_put_cooperator(bfqq);
 
-	bfq_put_queue(bfqq); /* release process reference */
+	bfq_release_process_ref(bfqd, bfqq);
 }
 
 static void bfq_exit_icq_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, bool is_sync)
@@ -5001,8 +5022,7 @@ static void bfq_check_ioprio_change(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, struct bio *bio)
 
 	bfqq = bic_to_bfqq(bic, false);
 	if (bfqq) {
-		/* release process reference on this queue */
-		bfq_put_queue(bfqq);
+		bfq_release_process_ref(bfqd, bfqq);
 		bfqq = bfq_get_queue(bfqd, bio, BLK_RW_ASYNC, bic);
 		bic_set_bfqq(bic, bfqq, false);
 	}
@@ -5963,7 +5983,7 @@ bfq_split_bfqq(struct bfq_io_cq *bic, struct bfq_queue *bfqq)
 
 	bfq_put_cooperator(bfqq);
 
-	bfq_put_queue(bfqq);
+	bfq_release_process_ref(bfqq->bfqd, bfqq);
 	return NULL;
 }
 

block/bio.c

@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ bool __bio_try_merge_page(struct bio *bio, struct page *page,
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(bio_flagged(bio, BIO_CLONED)))
 		return false;
 
-	if (bio->bi_vcnt > 0) {
+	if (bio->bi_vcnt > 0 && !bio_full(bio, len)) {
 		struct bio_vec *bv = &bio->bi_io_vec[bio->bi_vcnt - 1];
 
 		if (page_is_mergeable(bv, page, len, off, same_page)) {

block/blk-cgroup.c

@@ -934,9 +934,14 @@ static int blkcg_print_stat(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
 		int i;
 		bool has_stats = false;
 
+		spin_lock_irq(&blkg->q->queue_lock);
+
+		if (!blkg->online)
+			goto skip;
+
 		dname = blkg_dev_name(blkg);
 		if (!dname)
-			continue;
+			goto skip;
 
 		/*
 		 * Hooray string manipulation, count is the size written NOT
@@ -946,8 +951,6 @@ static int blkcg_print_stat(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
 		 */
 		off += scnprintf(buf+off, size-off, "%s ", dname);
 
-		spin_lock_irq(&blkg->q->queue_lock);
-
 		blkg_rwstat_recursive_sum(blkg, NULL,
 				offsetof(struct blkcg_gq, stat_bytes), &rwstat);
 		rbytes = rwstat.cnt[BLKG_RWSTAT_READ];
@@ -960,8 +963,6 @@ static int blkcg_print_stat(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
 		wios = rwstat.cnt[BLKG_RWSTAT_WRITE];
 		dios = rwstat.cnt[BLKG_RWSTAT_DISCARD];
 
-		spin_unlock_irq(&blkg->q->queue_lock);
-
 		if (rbytes || wbytes || rios || wios) {
 			has_stats = true;
 			off += scnprintf(buf+off, size-off,
@@ -999,6 +1000,8 @@ static int blkcg_print_stat(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
 				seq_commit(sf, -1);
 			}
 		}
+	skip:
+		spin_unlock_irq(&blkg->q->queue_lock);
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();

block/blk-iocost.c

@@ -1057,9 +1057,12 @@ static bool iocg_activate(struct ioc_gq *iocg, struct ioc_now *now)
 	atomic64_set(&iocg->active_period, cur_period);
 
 	/* already activated or breaking leaf-only constraint? */
-	for (i = iocg->level; i > 0; i--)
-		if (!list_empty(&iocg->active_list))
+	if (!list_empty(&iocg->active_list))
+		goto succeed_unlock;
+	for (i = iocg->level - 1; i > 0; i--)
+		if (!list_empty(&iocg->ancestors[i]->active_list))
 			goto fail_unlock;
+
 	if (iocg->child_active_sum)
 		goto fail_unlock;
 
@@ -1101,6 +1104,7 @@ static bool iocg_activate(struct ioc_gq *iocg, struct ioc_now *now)
 		ioc_start_period(ioc, now);
 	}
 
+succeed_unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irq(&ioc->lock);
 	return true;
 

drivers/base/cpu.c

@@ -554,12 +554,27 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev,
+					struct device_attribute *attr,
+					char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -568,6 +583,8 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
+	&dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr,
+	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 

drivers/base/memory.c

@@ -872,3 +872,39 @@ int walk_memory_blocks(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
+
+struct for_each_memory_block_cb_data {
+	walk_memory_blocks_func_t func;
+	void *arg;
+};
+
+static int for_each_memory_block_cb(struct device *dev, void *data)
+{
+	struct memory_block *mem = to_memory_block(dev);
+	struct for_each_memory_block_cb_data *cb_data = data;
+
+	return cb_data->func(mem, cb_data->arg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * for_each_memory_block - walk through all present memory blocks
+ *
+ * @arg: argument passed to func
+ * @func: callback for each memory block walked
+ *
+ * This function walks through all present memory blocks, calling func on
+ * each memory block.
+ *
+ * In case func() returns an error, walking is aborted and the error is
+ * returned.
+ */
+int for_each_memory_block(void *arg, walk_memory_blocks_func_t func)
+{
+	struct for_each_memory_block_cb_data cb_data = {
+		.func = func,
+		.arg = arg,
+	};
+
+	return bus_for_each_dev(&memory_subsys, NULL, &cb_data,
+				for_each_memory_block_cb);
+}

drivers/block/drbd/drbd_main.c

@@ -786,7 +786,6 @@ int __drbd_send_protocol(struct drbd_connection *connection, enum drbd_packet cm
 
 	if (nc->tentative && connection->agreed_pro_version < 92) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		mutex_unlock(&sock->mutex);
 		drbd_err(connection, "--dry-run is not supported by peer");
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}

drivers/block/nbd.c

@@ -993,6 +993,7 @@ static struct socket *nbd_get_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long fd,
 	if (sock->ops->shutdown == sock_no_shutdown) {
 		dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), "Unsupported socket: shutdown callout must be supported.\n");
 		*err = -EINVAL;
+		sockfd_put(sock);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 

drivers/block/rbd.c

@@ -2087,7 +2087,7 @@ static int rbd_object_map_update_finish(struct rbd_obj_request *obj_req,
 	struct rbd_device *rbd_dev = obj_req->img_request->rbd_dev;
 	struct ceph_osd_data *osd_data;
 	u64 objno;
-	u8 state, new_state, current_state;
+	u8 state, new_state, uninitialized_var(current_state);
 	bool has_current_state;
 	void *p;
 

drivers/block/rsxx/core.c

@@ -1000,8 +1000,10 @@ static void rsxx_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *dev)
 
 	cancel_work_sync(&card->event_work);
 
+	destroy_workqueue(card->event_wq);
 	rsxx_destroy_dev(card);
 	rsxx_dma_destroy(card);
+	destroy_workqueue(card->creg_ctrl.creg_wq);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&card->irq_lock, flags);
 	rsxx_disable_ier_and_isr(card, CR_INTR_ALL);

drivers/char/hw_random/core.c

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
-#include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/hw_random.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -422,9 +421,7 @@ static int hwrng_fillfn(void *unused)
 {
 	long rc;
 
-	set_freezable();
-
-	while (!kthread_freezable_should_stop(NULL)) {
+	while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
 		struct hwrng *rng;
 
 		rng = get_current_rng();

drivers/char/random.c

@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@
 #include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/cryptohash.h>
 #include <linux/fips.h>
-#include <linux/freezer.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -2500,8 +2499,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
 	 * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
 	 * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
 	 */
-	wait_event_freezable(random_write_wait,
-			kthread_should_stop() ||
+	wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait, kthread_should_stop() ||
 			ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
 	mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
 	credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);

drivers/char/virtio_console.c

@@ -1325,24 +1325,24 @@ static void set_console_size(struct port *port, u16 rows, u16 cols)
 	port->cons.ws.ws_col = cols;
 }
 
-static unsigned int fill_queue(struct virtqueue *vq, spinlock_t *lock)
+static int fill_queue(struct virtqueue *vq, spinlock_t *lock)
 {
 	struct port_buffer *buf;
-	unsigned int nr_added_bufs;
+	int nr_added_bufs;
 	int ret;
 
 	nr_added_bufs = 0;
 	do {
 		buf = alloc_buf(vq->vdev, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
 		if (!buf)
-			break;
+			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		spin_lock_irq(lock);
 		ret = add_inbuf(vq, buf);
 		if (ret < 0) {
 			spin_unlock_irq(lock);
 			free_buf(buf, true);
-			break;
+			return ret;
 		}
 		nr_added_bufs++;
 		spin_unlock_irq(lock);
@@ -1362,7 +1362,6 @@ static int add_port(struct ports_device *portdev, u32 id)
 	char debugfs_name[16];
 	struct port *port;
 	dev_t devt;
-	unsigned int nr_added_bufs;
 	int err;
 
 	port = kmalloc(sizeof(*port), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1421,11 +1420,13 @@ static int add_port(struct ports_device *portdev, u32 id)
 	spin_lock_init(&port->outvq_lock);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&port->waitqueue);
 
-	/* Fill the in_vq with buffers so the host can send us data. */
-	nr_added_bufs = fill_queue(port->in_vq, &port->inbuf_lock);
-	if (!nr_added_bufs) {
+	/* We can safely ignore ENOSPC because it means
+	 * the queue already has buffers. Buffers are removed
+	 * only by virtcons_remove(), not by unplug_port()
+	 */
+	err = fill_queue(port->in_vq, &port->inbuf_lock);
+	if (err < 0 && err != -ENOSPC) {
 		dev_err(port->dev, "Error allocating inbufs\n");
-		err = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_device;
 	}
 
@@ -2059,14 +2060,11 @@ static int virtcons_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 	INIT_WORK(&portdev->control_work, &control_work_handler);
 
 	if (multiport) {
-		unsigned int nr_added_bufs;
-
 		spin_lock_init(&portdev->c_ivq_lock);
 		spin_lock_init(&portdev->c_ovq_lock);
 
-		nr_added_bufs = fill_queue(portdev->c_ivq,
-					   &portdev->c_ivq_lock);
-		if (!nr_added_bufs) {
+		err = fill_queue(portdev->c_ivq, &portdev->c_ivq_lock);
+		if (err < 0) {
 			dev_err(&vdev->dev,
 				"Error allocating buffers for control queue\n");
 			/*
@@ -2077,7 +2075,7 @@ static int virtcons_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 					   VIRTIO_CONSOLE_DEVICE_READY, 0);
 			/* Device was functional: we need full cleanup. */
 			virtcons_remove(vdev);
-			return -ENOMEM;
+			return err;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/*

drivers/clk/at91/clk-main.c

@@ -297,7 +297,10 @@ static int clk_main_probe_frequency(struct regmap *regmap)
 		regmap_read(regmap, AT91_CKGR_MCFR, &mcfr);
 		if (mcfr & AT91_PMC_MAINRDY)
 			return 0;
-		usleep_range(MAINF_LOOP_MIN_WAIT, MAINF_LOOP_MAX_WAIT);
+		if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+			udelay(MAINF_LOOP_MIN_WAIT);
+		else
+			usleep_range(MAINF_LOOP_MIN_WAIT, MAINF_LOOP_MAX_WAIT);
 	} while (time_before(prep_time, timeout));
 
 	return -ETIMEDOUT;

drivers/clk/at91/sam9x60.c

@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static const struct clk_pll_characteristics upll_characteristics = {
 };
 
 static const struct clk_programmable_layout sam9x60_programmable_layout = {
+	.pres_mask = 0xff,
 	.pres_shift = 8,
 	.css_mask = 0x1f,
 	.have_slck_mck = 0,

drivers/clk/at91/sckc.c

@@ -76,7 +76,10 @@ static int clk_slow_osc_prepare(struct clk_hw *hw)
 
 	writel(tmp | osc->bits->cr_osc32en, sckcr);
 
-	usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
+	if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+		udelay(osc->startup_usec);
+	else
+		usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -187,7 +190,10 @@ static int clk_slow_rc_osc_prepare(struct clk_hw *hw)
 
 	writel(readl(sckcr) | osc->bits->cr_rcen, sckcr);
 
-	usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
+	if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+		udelay(osc->startup_usec);
+	else
+		usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -288,7 +294,10 @@ static int clk_sam9x5_slow_set_parent(struct clk_hw *hw, u8 index)
 
 	writel(tmp, sckcr);
 
-	usleep_range(SLOWCK_SW_TIME_USEC, SLOWCK_SW_TIME_USEC + 1);
+	if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+		udelay(SLOWCK_SW_TIME_USEC);
+	else
+		usleep_range(SLOWCK_SW_TIME_USEC, SLOWCK_SW_TIME_USEC + 1);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -533,7 +542,10 @@ static int clk_sama5d4_slow_osc_prepare(struct clk_hw *hw)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
+	if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+		udelay(osc->startup_usec);
+	else
+		usleep_range(osc->startup_usec, osc->startup_usec + 1);
 	osc->prepared = true;
 
 	return 0;

drivers/clk/clk-ast2600.c

@@ -266,10 +266,11 @@ static int aspeed_g6_clk_enable(struct clk_hw *hw)
 
 	/* Enable clock */
 	if (gate->flags & CLK_GATE_SET_TO_DISABLE) {
-		regmap_write(gate->map, get_clock_reg(gate), clk);
-	} else {
-		/* Use set to clear register */
+		/* Clock is clear to enable, so use set to clear register */
 		regmap_write(gate->map, get_clock_reg(gate) + 0x04, clk);
+	} else {
+		/* Clock is set to enable, so use write to set register */
+		regmap_write(gate->map, get_clock_reg(gate), clk);
 	}
 
 	if (gate->reset_idx >= 0) {

drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8mm.c

@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ static int imx8mm_clocks_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 					   clks[IMX8MM_CLK_A53_DIV],
 					   clks[IMX8MM_CLK_A53_SRC],
 					   clks[IMX8MM_ARM_PLL_OUT],
-					   clks[IMX8MM_CLK_24M]);
+					   clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL1_800M]);
 
 	imx_check_clocks(clks, ARRAY_SIZE(clks));
 

drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8mn.c

@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ static int imx8mn_clocks_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 					   clks[IMX8MN_CLK_A53_DIV],
 					   clks[IMX8MN_CLK_A53_SRC],
 					   clks[IMX8MN_ARM_PLL_OUT],
-					   clks[IMX8MN_CLK_24M]);
+					   clks[IMX8MN_SYS_PLL1_800M]);
 
 	imx_check_clocks(clks, ARRAY_SIZE(clks));
 

drivers/clk/meson/g12a.c

@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12a_cpu_clk_premux0 = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPU_CLK_CNTL0,
 		.mask = 0x3,
 		.shift = 0,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpu_clk_dyn0_sel",
@@ -353,8 +354,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12a_cpu_clk_premux0 = {
 			{ .hw = &g12a_fclk_div3.hw },
 		},
 		.num_parents = 3,
-		/* This sub-tree is used a parking clock */
-		.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_NO_REPARENT,
+		.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 	},
 };
 
@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12a_cpu_clk_postmux0 = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPU_CLK_CNTL0,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 2,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpu_clk_dyn0",
@@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12a_cpu_clk_dyn = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPU_CLK_CNTL0,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 10,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpu_clk_dyn",
@@ -485,6 +487,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12a_cpu_clk = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPU_CLK_CNTL0,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 11,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpu_clk",
@@ -504,6 +507,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpu_clk = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPU_CLK_CNTL0,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 11,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpu_clk",
@@ -523,6 +527,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpub_clk_premux0 = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPUB_CLK_CNTL,
 		.mask = 0x3,
 		.shift = 0,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpub_clk_dyn0_sel",
@@ -533,6 +538,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpub_clk_premux0 = {
 			{ .hw = &g12a_fclk_div3.hw },
 		},
 		.num_parents = 3,
+		.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 	},
 };
 
@@ -567,6 +573,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpub_clk_postmux0 = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPUB_CLK_CNTL,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 2,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpub_clk_dyn0",
@@ -644,6 +651,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpub_clk_dyn = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPUB_CLK_CNTL,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 10,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpub_clk_dyn",
@@ -663,6 +671,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap g12b_cpub_clk = {
 		.offset = HHI_SYS_CPUB_CLK_CNTL,
 		.mask = 0x1,
 		.shift = 11,
+		.flags = CLK_MUX_ROUND_CLOSEST,
 	},
 	.hw.init = &(struct clk_init_data){
 		.name = "cpub_clk",

drivers/clk/meson/gxbb.c

@@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ static struct clk_regmap gxbb_sar_adc_clk_div = {
 			&gxbb_sar_adc_clk_sel.hw
 		},
 		.num_parents = 1,
+		.flags = CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT,
 	},
 };
 

drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5420.c

@@ -165,12 +165,18 @@ static const unsigned long exynos5x_clk_regs[] __initconst = {
 	GATE_BUS_CPU,
 	GATE_SCLK_CPU,
 	CLKOUT_CMU_CPU,
+	CPLL_CON0,
+	DPLL_CON0,
 	EPLL_CON0,
 	EPLL_CON1,
 	EPLL_CON2,
 	RPLL_CON0,
 	RPLL_CON1,
 	RPLL_CON2,
+	IPLL_CON0,
+	SPLL_CON0,
+	VPLL_CON0,
+	MPLL_CON0,
 	SRC_TOP0,
 	SRC_TOP1,
 	SRC_TOP2,
@@ -1172,8 +1178,6 @@ static const struct samsung_gate_clock exynos5x_gate_clks[] __initconst = {
 	GATE(CLK_SCLK_ISP_SENSOR2, "sclk_isp_sensor2", "dout_isp_sensor2",
 			GATE_TOP_SCLK_ISP, 12, CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT, 0),
 
-	GATE(CLK_G3D, "g3d", "mout_user_aclk_g3d", GATE_IP_G3D, 9, 0, 0),
-
 	/* CDREX */
 	GATE(CLK_CLKM_PHY0, "clkm_phy0", "dout_sclk_cdrex",
 			GATE_BUS_CDREX0, 0, 0, 0),
@@ -1248,6 +1252,15 @@ static struct exynos5_subcmu_reg_dump exynos5x_gsc_suspend_regs[] = {
 	{ DIV2_RATIO0, 0, 0x30 },	/* DIV dout_gscl_blk_300 */
 };
 
+static const struct samsung_gate_clock exynos5x_g3d_gate_clks[] __initconst = {
+	GATE(CLK_G3D, "g3d", "mout_user_aclk_g3d", GATE_IP_G3D, 9, 0, 0),
+};
+
+static struct exynos5_subcmu_reg_dump exynos5x_g3d_suspend_regs[] = {
+	{ GATE_IP_G3D, 0x3ff, 0x3ff },	/* G3D gates */
+	{ SRC_TOP5, 0, BIT(16) },	/* MUX mout_user_aclk_g3d */
+};
+
 static const struct samsung_div_clock exynos5x_mfc_div_clks[] __initconst = {
 	DIV(0, "dout_mfc_blk", "mout_user_aclk333", DIV4_RATIO, 0, 2),
 };
@@ -1320,6 +1333,14 @@ static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info exynos5x_gsc_subcmu = {
 	.pd_name	= "GSC",
 };
 
+static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info exynos5x_g3d_subcmu = {
+	.gate_clks	= exynos5x_g3d_gate_clks,
+	.nr_gate_clks	= ARRAY_SIZE(exynos5x_g3d_gate_clks),
+	.suspend_regs	= exynos5x_g3d_suspend_regs,
+	.nr_suspend_regs = ARRAY_SIZE(exynos5x_g3d_suspend_regs),
+	.pd_name	= "G3D",
+};
+
 static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info exynos5x_mfc_subcmu = {
 	.div_clks	= exynos5x_mfc_div_clks,
 	.nr_div_clks	= ARRAY_SIZE(exynos5x_mfc_div_clks),
@@ -1351,6 +1372,7 @@ static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info exynos5800_mau_subcmu = {
 static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info *exynos5x_subcmus[] = {
 	&exynos5x_disp_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_gsc_subcmu,
+	&exynos5x_g3d_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_mfc_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_mscl_subcmu,
 };
@@ -1358,6 +1380,7 @@ static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info *exynos5x_subcmus[] = {
 static const struct exynos5_subcmu_info *exynos5800_subcmus[] = {
 	&exynos5x_disp_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_gsc_subcmu,
+	&exynos5x_g3d_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_mfc_subcmu,
 	&exynos5x_mscl_subcmu,
 	&exynos5800_mau_subcmu,

drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5433.c

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
 #include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #include <dt-bindings/clock/exynos5433.h>
 
@@ -5584,6 +5585,8 @@ static int __init exynos5433_cmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	data->clk_save = samsung_clk_alloc_reg_dump(info->clk_regs,
 						    info->nr_clk_regs);
+	if (!data->clk_save)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	data->nr_clk_save = info->nr_clk_regs;
 	data->clk_suspend = info->suspend_regs;
 	data->nr_clk_suspend = info->nr_suspend_regs;
@@ -5592,12 +5595,19 @@ static int __init exynos5433_cmu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (data->nr_pclks > 0) {
 		data->pclks = devm_kcalloc(dev, sizeof(struct clk *),
 					   data->nr_pclks, GFP_KERNEL);
-
+		if (!data->pclks) {
+			kfree(data->clk_save);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
 		for (i = 0; i < data->nr_pclks; i++) {
 			struct clk *clk = of_clk_get(dev->of_node, i);
 
-			if (IS_ERR(clk))
+			if (IS_ERR(clk)) {
+				kfree(data->clk_save);
+				while (--i >= 0)
+					clk_put(data->pclks[i]);
 				return PTR_ERR(clk);
+			}
 			data->pclks[i] = clk;
 		}
 	}

drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun9i-a80.c

@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static int sun9i_a80_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Enforce d1 = 0, d2 = 0 for Audio PLL */
 	val = readl(reg + SUN9I_A80_PLL_AUDIO_REG);
-	val &= (BIT(16) & BIT(18));
+	val &= ~(BIT(16) | BIT(18));
 	writel(val, reg + SUN9I_A80_PLL_AUDIO_REG);
 
 	/* Enforce P = 1 for both CPU cluster PLLs */

drivers/clk/sunxi/clk-sunxi.c

@@ -1080,8 +1080,8 @@ static struct clk ** __init sunxi_divs_clk_setup(struct device_node *node,
 						 rate_hw, rate_ops,
 						 gate_hw, &clk_gate_ops,
 						 clkflags |
-						 data->div[i].critical ?
-							CLK_IS_CRITICAL : 0);
+						 (data->div[i].critical ?
+							CLK_IS_CRITICAL : 0));
 
 		WARN_ON(IS_ERR(clk_data->clks[i]));
 	}

drivers/clk/ti/clk-dra7-atl.c

@@ -174,7 +174,6 @@ static void __init of_dra7_atl_clock_setup(struct device_node *node)
 	struct clk_init_data init = { NULL };
 	const char **parent_names = NULL;
 	struct clk *clk;
-	int ret;
 
 	clk_hw = kzalloc(sizeof(*clk_hw), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!clk_hw) {
@@ -207,11 +206,6 @@ static void __init of_dra7_atl_clock_setup(struct device_node *node)
 	clk = ti_clk_register(NULL, &clk_hw->hw, node->name);
 
 	if (!IS_ERR(clk)) {
-		ret = ti_clk_add_alias(NULL, clk, node->name);
-		if (ret) {
-			clk_unregister(clk);
-			goto cleanup;
-		}
 		of_clk_add_provider(node, of_clk_src_simple_get, clk);
 		kfree(parent_names);
 		return;

drivers/clk/ti/clkctrl.c

@@ -100,11 +100,12 @@ static bool _omap4_is_timeout(union omap4_timeout *time, u32 timeout)
 	 * can be from a timer that requires pm_runtime access, which
 	 * will eventually bring us here with timekeeping_suspended,
 	 * during both suspend entry and resume paths. This happens
-	 * at least on am43xx platform.
+	 * at least on am43xx platform. Account for flakeyness
+	 * with udelay() by multiplying the timeout value by 2.
 	 */
 	if (unlikely(_early_timeout || timekeeping_suspended)) {
 		if (time->cycles++ < timeout) {
-			udelay(1);
+			udelay(1 * 2);
 			return false;
 		}
 	} else {

drivers/clocksource/sh_mtu2.c

@@ -328,12 +328,13 @@ static int sh_mtu2_register(struct sh_mtu2_channel *ch, const char *name)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static const unsigned int sh_mtu2_channel_offsets[] = {
+	0x300, 0x380, 0x000,
+};
+
 static int sh_mtu2_setup_channel(struct sh_mtu2_channel *ch, unsigned int index,
 				 struct sh_mtu2_device *mtu)
 {
-	static const unsigned int channel_offsets[] = {
-		0x300, 0x380, 0x000,
-	};
 	char name[6];
 	int irq;
 	int ret;
@@ -356,7 +357,7 @@ static int sh_mtu2_setup_channel(struct sh_mtu2_channel *ch, unsigned int index,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	ch->base = mtu->mapbase + channel_offsets[index];
+	ch->base = mtu->mapbase + sh_mtu2_channel_offsets[index];
 	ch->index = index;
 
 	return sh_mtu2_register(ch, dev_name(&mtu->pdev->dev));
@@ -408,7 +409,12 @@ static int sh_mtu2_setup(struct sh_mtu2_device *mtu,
 	}
 
 	/* Allocate and setup the channels. */
-	mtu->num_channels = 3;
+	ret = platform_irq_count(pdev);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_unmap;
+
+	mtu->num_channels = min_t(unsigned int, ret,
+				  ARRAY_SIZE(sh_mtu2_channel_offsets));
 
 	mtu->channels = kcalloc(mtu->num_channels, sizeof(*mtu->channels),
 				GFP_KERNEL);

drivers/clocksource/timer-mediatek.c

@@ -268,15 +268,12 @@ static int __init mtk_syst_init(struct device_node *node)
 
 	ret = timer_of_init(node, &to);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err;
+		return ret;
 
 	clockevents_config_and_register(&to.clkevt, timer_of_rate(&to),
 					TIMER_SYNC_TICKS, 0xffffffff);
 
 	return 0;
-err:
-	timer_of_cleanup(&to);
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int __init mtk_gpt_init(struct device_node *node)
@@ -293,7 +290,7 @@ static int __init mtk_gpt_init(struct device_node *node)
 
 	ret = timer_of_init(node, &to);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err;
+		return ret;
 
 	/* Configure clock source */
 	mtk_gpt_setup(&to, TIMER_CLK_SRC, GPT_CTRL_OP_FREERUN);
@@ -311,9 +308,6 @@ static int __init mtk_gpt_init(struct device_node *node)
 	mtk_gpt_enable_irq(&to, TIMER_CLK_EVT);
 
 	return 0;
-err:
-	timer_of_cleanup(&to);
-	return ret;
 }
 TIMER_OF_DECLARE(mtk_mt6577, "mediatek,mt6577-timer", mtk_gpt_init);
 TIMER_OF_DECLARE(mtk_mt6765, "mediatek,mt6765-timer", mtk_syst_init);

drivers/cpufreq/intel_pstate.c

@@ -847,11 +847,9 @@ static void intel_pstate_hwp_force_min_perf(int cpu)
 	value |= HWP_MAX_PERF(min_perf);
 	value |= HWP_MIN_PERF(min_perf);
 
-	/* Set EPP/EPB to min */
+	/* Set EPP to min */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HWP_EPP))
 		value |= HWP_ENERGY_PERF_PREFERENCE(HWP_EPP_POWERSAVE);
-	else
-		intel_pstate_set_epb(cpu, HWP_EPP_BALANCE_POWERSAVE);
 
 	wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_HWP_REQUEST, value);
 }

drivers/gpio/gpio-bd70528.c

@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ static int bd70528_set_debounce(struct bd70528_gpio *bdgpio,
 	case 0:
 		val = BD70528_DEBOUNCE_DISABLE;
 		break;
-	case 1 ... 15:
+	case 1 ... 15000:
 		val = BD70528_DEBOUNCE_15MS;
 		break;
-	case 16 ... 30:
+	case 15001 ... 30000:
 		val = BD70528_DEBOUNCE_30MS;
 		break;
-	case 31 ... 50:
+	case 30001 ... 50000:
 		val = BD70528_DEBOUNCE_50MS;
 		break;
 	default:

drivers/gpio/gpio-max77620.c

@@ -192,13 +192,13 @@ static int max77620_gpio_set_debounce(struct max77620_gpio *mgpio,
 	case 0:
 		val = MAX77620_CNFG_GPIO_DBNC_None;
 		break;
-	case 1000 ... 8000:
+	case 1 ... 8000:
 		val = MAX77620_CNFG_GPIO_DBNC_8ms;
 		break;
-	case 9000 ... 16000:
+	case 8001 ... 16000:
 		val = MAX77620_CNFG_GPIO_DBNC_16ms;
 		break;
-	case 17000 ... 32000:
+	case 16001 ... 32000:
 		val = MAX77620_CNFG_GPIO_DBNC_32ms;
 		break;
 	default:

drivers/gpio/gpio-merrifield.c

@@ -362,9 +362,8 @@ static void mrfld_irq_handler(struct irq_desc *desc)
 	chained_irq_exit(irqchip, desc);
 }
 
-static int mrfld_irq_init_hw(struct gpio_chip *chip)
+static void mrfld_irq_init_hw(struct mrfld_gpio *priv)
 {
-	struct mrfld_gpio *priv = gpiochip_get_data(chip);
 	void __iomem *reg;
 	unsigned int base;
 
@@ -376,8 +375,6 @@ static int mrfld_irq_init_hw(struct gpio_chip *chip)
 		reg = gpio_reg(&priv->chip, base, GFER);
 		writel(0, reg);
 	}
-
-	return 0;
 }
 
 static const char *mrfld_gpio_get_pinctrl_dev_name(struct mrfld_gpio *priv)
@@ -400,7 +397,6 @@ static int mrfld_gpio_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id
 {
 	const struct mrfld_gpio_pinrange *range;
 	const char *pinctrl_dev_name;
-	struct gpio_irq_chip *girq;
 	struct mrfld_gpio *priv;
 	u32 gpio_base, irq_base;
 	void __iomem *base;
@@ -448,21 +444,6 @@ static int mrfld_gpio_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id
 
 	raw_spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);
 
-	girq = &priv->chip.irq;
-	girq->chip = &mrfld_irqchip;
-	girq->init_hw = mrfld_irq_init_hw;
-	girq->parent_handler = mrfld_irq_handler;
-	girq->num_parents = 1;
-	girq->parents = devm_kcalloc(&pdev->dev, girq->num_parents,
-				     sizeof(*girq->parents),
-				     GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!girq->parents)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	girq->parents[0] = pdev->irq;
-	girq->first = irq_base;
-	girq->default_type = IRQ_TYPE_NONE;
-	girq->handler = handle_bad_irq;
-
 	pci_set_drvdata(pdev, priv);
 	retval = devm_gpiochip_add_data(&pdev->dev, &priv->chip, priv);
 	if (retval) {
@@ -484,6 +465,18 @@ static int mrfld_gpio_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id
 		}
 	}
 
+	retval = gpiochip_irqchip_add(&priv->chip, &mrfld_irqchip, irq_base,
+				      handle_bad_irq, IRQ_TYPE_NONE);
+	if (retval) {
+		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "could not connect irqchip to gpiochip\n");
+		return retval;
+	}
+
+	mrfld_irq_init_hw(priv);
+
+	gpiochip_set_chained_irqchip(&priv->chip, &mrfld_irqchip, pdev->irq,
+				     mrfld_irq_handler);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

drivers/gpio/gpiolib-acpi.c

@@ -1304,11 +1304,28 @@ late_initcall_sync(acpi_gpio_handle_deferred_request_irqs);
 
 static const struct dmi_system_id run_edge_events_on_boot_blacklist[] = {
 	{
+		/*
+		 * The Minix Neo Z83-4 has a micro-USB-B id-pin handler for
+		 * a non existing micro-USB-B connector which puts the HDMI
+		 * DDC pins in GPIO mode, breaking HDMI support.
+		 */
 		.matches = {
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "MINIX"),
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Z83-4"),
 		}
 	},
+	{
+		/*
+		 * The Terra Pad 1061 has a micro-USB-B id-pin handler, which
+		 * instead of controlling the actual micro-USB-B turns the 5V
+		 * boost for its USB-A connector off. The actual micro-USB-B
+		 * connector is wired for charging only.
+		 */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Wortmann_AG"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "TERRA_PAD_1061"),
+		}
+	},
 	{} /* Terminating entry */
 };
 

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_ctx.c

@@ -604,8 +604,11 @@ void amdgpu_ctx_mgr_entity_fini(struct amdgpu_ctx_mgr *mgr)
 			continue;
 		}
 
-		for (i = 0; i < num_entities; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < num_entities; i++) {
+			mutex_lock(&ctx->adev->lock_reset);
 			drm_sched_entity_fini(&ctx->entities[0][i].entity);
+			mutex_unlock(&ctx->adev->lock_reset);
+		}
 	}
 }
 

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_device.c

@@ -2885,6 +2885,13 @@ fence_driver_init:
 			DRM_INFO("amdgpu: acceleration disabled, skipping benchmarks\n");
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Register gpu instance before amdgpu_device_enable_mgpu_fan_boost.
+	 * Otherwise the mgpu fan boost feature will be skipped due to the
+	 * gpu instance is counted less.
+	 */
+	amdgpu_register_gpu_instance(adev);
+
 	/* enable clockgating, etc. after ib tests, etc. since some blocks require
 	 * explicit gating rather than handling it automatically.
 	 */

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_display.c

@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ uint32_t amdgpu_display_supported_domains(struct amdgpu_device *adev,
 	 * Also, don't allow GTT domain if the BO doens't have USWC falg set.
 	 */
 	if (adev->asic_type >= CHIP_CARRIZO &&
-	    adev->asic_type <= CHIP_RAVEN &&
+	    adev->asic_type < CHIP_RAVEN &&
 	    (adev->flags & AMD_IS_APU) &&
 	    (bo_flags & AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_CPU_GTT_USWC) &&
 	    amdgpu_bo_support_uswc(bo_flags) &&

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_drv.c

@@ -1013,9 +1013,10 @@ static const struct pci_device_id pciidlist[] = {
 	{0x1002, 0x731B, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI10},
 	{0x1002, 0x731F, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI10},
 	/* Navi14 */
-	{0x1002, 0x7340, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14|AMD_EXP_HW_SUPPORT},
-	{0x1002, 0x7341, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14|AMD_EXP_HW_SUPPORT},
-	{0x1002, 0x7347, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14|AMD_EXP_HW_SUPPORT},
+	{0x1002, 0x7340, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14},
+	{0x1002, 0x7341, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14},
+	{0x1002, 0x7347, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14},
+	{0x1002, 0x734F, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_NAVI14},
 
 	/* Renoir */
 	{0x1002, 0x1636, PCI_ANY_ID, PCI_ANY_ID, 0, 0, CHIP_RENOIR|AMD_IS_APU|AMD_EXP_HW_SUPPORT},

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gfx.h

@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ struct amdgpu_gfx {
 	uint32_t			mec2_feature_version;
 	bool				mec_fw_write_wait;
 	bool				me_fw_write_wait;
+	bool				cp_fw_write_wait;
 	struct amdgpu_ring		gfx_ring[AMDGPU_MAX_GFX_RINGS];
 	unsigned			num_gfx_rings;
 	struct amdgpu_ring		compute_ring[AMDGPU_MAX_COMPUTE_RINGS];

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_kms.c

@@ -190,7 +190,6 @@ int amdgpu_driver_load_kms(struct drm_device *dev, unsigned long flags)
 		pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(dev->dev);
 	}
 
-	amdgpu_register_gpu_instance(adev);
 out:
 	if (r) {
 		/* balance pm_runtime_get_sync in amdgpu_driver_unload_kms */
@@ -650,15 +649,19 @@ static int amdgpu_info_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, struct drm_file
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		alloc_size = info->read_mmr_reg.count * sizeof(*regs);
 
-		for (i = 0; i < info->read_mmr_reg.count; i++)
+		amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, false);
+		for (i = 0; i < info->read_mmr_reg.count; i++) {
 			if (amdgpu_asic_read_register(adev, se_num, sh_num,
 						      info->read_mmr_reg.dword_offset + i,
 						      &regs[i])) {
 				DRM_DEBUG_KMS("unallowed offset %#x\n",
 					      info->read_mmr_reg.dword_offset + i);
 				kfree(regs);
+				amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, true);
 				return -EFAULT;
 			}
+		}
+		amdgpu_gfx_off_ctrl(adev, true);
 		n = copy_to_user(out, regs, min(size, alloc_size));
 		kfree(regs);
 		return n ? -EFAULT : 0;