af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS.

As long as recvmsg() or recvmmsg() is used with cmsg, it is not
possible to avoid receiving file descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS.

This behaviour has occasionally been flagged as problematic, as
it can be (ab)used to trigger DoS during close(), for example, by
passing a FUSE-controlled fd or a hung NFS fd.

For instance, as noted on the uAPI Group page [0], an untrusted peer
could send a file descriptor pointing to a hung NFS mount and then
close it.  Once the receiver calls recvmsg() with msg_control, the
descriptor is automatically installed, and then the responsibility
for the final close() now falls on the receiver, which may result
in blocking the process for a long time.

Regarding this, systemd calls cmsg_close_all() [1] after each
recvmsg() to close() unwanted file descriptors sent via SCM_RIGHTS.

However, this cannot work around the issue at all, because the final
fput() may still occur on the receiver's side once sendmsg() with
SCM_RIGHTS succeeds.  Also, even filtering by LSM at recvmsg() does
not work for the same reason.

Thus, we need a better way to refuse SCM_RIGHTS at sendmsg().

Let's introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS to disable SCM_RIGHTS.

Note that this option is enabled by default for backward
compatibility.

Link: https://uapi-group.org/kernel-features/#disabling-reception-of-scm_rights-for-af_unix-sockets #[0]
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/v257.5/src/basic/fd-util.c#L612-L628 #[1]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-19 13:57:59 -07:00
committed by David S. Miller
parent 3f84d577b7
commit 77cbe1a6d8
9 changed files with 49 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@
#define SO_RCVPRIORITY 82
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 83
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64

View File

@@ -161,6 +161,8 @@
#define SO_RCVPRIORITY 82
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 83
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64

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@@ -142,6 +142,8 @@
#define SCM_DEVMEM_DMABUF SO_DEVMEM_DMABUF
#define SO_DEVMEM_DONTNEED 0x4050
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 0x4051
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64

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@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@
#define SO_RCVPRIORITY 0x005b
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 0x005c
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)

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@@ -341,6 +341,7 @@ struct sk_filter;
* @sk_scm_credentials: flagged by SO_PASSCRED to recv SCM_CREDENTIALS
* @sk_scm_security: flagged by SO_PASSSEC to recv SCM_SECURITY
* @sk_scm_pidfd: flagged by SO_PASSPIDFD to recv SCM_PIDFD
* @sk_scm_rights: flagged by SO_PASSRIGHTS to recv SCM_RIGHTS
* @sk_scm_unused: unused flags for scm_recv()
* @ns_tracker: tracker for netns reference
* @sk_user_frags: xarray of pages the user is holding a reference on.
@@ -535,7 +536,8 @@ struct sock {
u8 sk_scm_credentials : 1,
sk_scm_security : 1,
sk_scm_pidfd : 1,
sk_scm_unused : 5;
sk_scm_rights : 1,
sk_scm_unused : 4;
};
};
u8 sk_clockid;

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@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@
#define SO_RCVPRIORITY 82
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 83
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64 || (defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__))

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@@ -1571,6 +1571,13 @@ set_sndbuf:
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SO_PASSRIGHTS:
if (sk_is_unix(sk))
sk->sk_scm_rights = valbool;
else
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case SO_INCOMING_CPU:
reuseport_update_incoming_cpu(sk, val);
break;
@@ -1879,6 +1886,13 @@ int sk_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
v.val = sk->sk_scm_pidfd;
break;
case SO_PASSRIGHTS:
if (!sk_is_unix(sk))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
v.val = sk->sk_scm_rights;
break;
case SO_PEERCRED:
{
struct ucred peercred;

View File

@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_create1(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int kern,
sock_init_data(sock, sk);
sk->sk_scm_rights = 1;
sk->sk_hash = unix_unbound_hash(sk);
sk->sk_allocation = GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT;
sk->sk_write_space = unix_write_space;
@@ -2073,6 +2074,11 @@ restart_locked:
goto out_unlock;
}
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp && !other->sk_scm_rights) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = security_unix_may_send(sk->sk_socket, other->sk_socket);
if (err)
@@ -2174,9 +2180,13 @@ static int queue_oob(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *other,
if (sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD) ||
(other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)) {
unix_state_unlock(other);
err = -EPIPE;
goto out;
goto out_unlock;
}
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp && !other->sk_scm_rights) {
err = -EPERM;
goto out_unlock;
}
unix_maybe_add_creds(skb, sk, other);
@@ -2192,6 +2202,8 @@ static int queue_oob(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, struct sock *other,
other->sk_data_ready(other);
return 0;
out_unlock:
unix_state_unlock(other);
out:
consume_skb(skb);
return err;
@@ -2295,6 +2307,12 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
(other->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
goto out_pipe_unlock;
if (UNIXCB(skb).fp && !other->sk_scm_rights) {
unix_state_unlock(other);
err = -EPERM;
goto out_free;
}
unix_maybe_add_creds(skb, sk, other);
scm_stat_add(other, skb);
skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);

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@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@
#define SO_RCVPRIORITY 82
#define SO_PASSRIGHTS 83
#if !defined(__KERNEL__)
#if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64 || (defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__))