Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random

Pull /dev/random updates from Ted Ts'o:
 "This adds a memzero_explicit() call which is guaranteed not to be
  optimized away by GCC.  This is important when we are wiping
  cryptographically sensitive material"

* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
  crypto: memzero_explicit - make sure to clear out sensitive data
  random: add and use memzero_explicit() for clearing data
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2014-10-24 12:33:32 -07:00
10 changed files with 36 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
__mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
memset(workspace, 0, sizeof(workspace));
memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
/*
* In case the hash function has some recognizable output
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
}
/*
@@ -1175,7 +1175,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
}
/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
return ret;
}
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struct entropy_store *r, void __user *buf,
}
/* Wipe data just returned from memory */
memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
return ret;
}